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MAINE LAW REVIEW
A COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES
Martin A. Rogofft
I. INTRODUCTION
In the American legal system, the Constitution is the fundamental
legal document. All law, and in fact any exercise of public power in
any form, is evaluated for validity by constitutional standards. The
Constitution deals with such crucially important matters as the
structure and operation of government and the fundamental rights
of the governed. The Constitution is also the most important sym-
bol of American national life and the perceived repository of the
most cherished values of the American people. In France, in
marked contrast, a comprehensive code of private law, the Code
civil, has for a long time occupied a similar central place in legal and
national life,' and constitutions have had far less practical and sym-
bolic importance. My experience teaching in both French and
American law schools convinces me that it is often difficult for per-
sons brought up in American legal culture to understand and appre-
ciate the historical and contemporary importance of the Code civil
in the French legal system and the relative lack of importance of the
Constitution; likewise, persons educated in France often have simi-
lar difficulty in understanding and appreciating the centrality of the
Constitution (and the role of judges in applying the Constitution) in
the American legal system and the unsystematic and fragmented
state of our private law.'
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.A., Cornell
University; M.A., University of California (Berkeley); LL.B., Yale University. The
Author would like to thank Christopher King MacLean of the University of Maine
School of Law Class of 1996 for his research assistance.
1. See Jean Carbonnier, Le Code Civil, in 2 LEs LIEUx DE M1MOIRE: LA NATION
293 (Pierre Nora ed., 1986); Shael Herman, From Philosophers to Legislators, and
Legislators to Gods: The French Civil Code as Secular Scripture, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV.
597. But see Antonio Gambaro, Codes and Constitutions in Civil Law, in EUROPEAN
LEGAL TRADITONS AND ISRAEL 157 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 1994). For
concise, comprehensive descriptions of the Code civil, see JEAN-Louis HALPARIN,
LE CODE CIVIL (1996); JEAN-MICHEL POUGHON, LE CODE CIVIL (1992).
2. On attempts to rationalize and systematize private law in the United States,
see David Dudley Field, Codification, in 3 SPEECHiES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLA-
NEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 238 (Titus Munson Coan ed., 1890); Law-
rence M. Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U. L. J. 351
(1969); Maxwell Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of
American Legal Reform, 1820-1830, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 234 (1967); Mildred V.
Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
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It is the purpose of this Essay to describe and account for the
differing conceptions of constitutionalism in the United States and
France. My central thesis is that both the United States Constitu-
tion and the French Code civil represent the incarnation in legal
form of national movements that emerged triumphant from revolu-
tionary struggles.3 While the American Revolution was one against
perceived abuses of public power (the British government and colo-
nial authorities), the French Revolution was directed primarily
against private oppression (the remnants of the feudal system and
the power and privileges of the Church and aristocracy) and the ju-
dicial class that was its bulwark.4 Thus, the documents embodying
the revolutionary programs and expressing the deepest aspirations
of each society necessarily took different forms: a Constitution in
the United States, with its emphasis on the separation and limitation
of (public) power; and a code of private law in France, based on the
principles of legislative supremacy, equality, the personal and eco-
nomic autonomy of the individual, and absolute ownership and free-
dom of alienation of property.5
3. Both the United States Constitution of 1788 and the French Code civil of 1804
entered into force several years after the dates that are usually associated with the
revolutions in the two countries, 1776-1783 in the United States (the period between
the adoption of the Declaration of Independence and the conclusion of the Treaty of
Peace between the American states and Great Britain) and 1789-1799 in France (the
period between the commencement of overt revolutionary activity and the ascension
to power of Napoleon Bonaparte). Thus, both documents may be said not only to
embody the revolutionary tradition, but also to benefit from certain sober -second
thoughts" provoked by the disorder and excess of the revolutionary and post-revolu-
tionary periods.
4. See JOHN DAWsON, THE ORAcES OF rmE LAw 263-373 (1968); see also Fran-
gois Furet, Night of August 4, in A CRrrcAL DICIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLU-
"17ON 107 (Frangois Furet & Mona Ozouf eds. & Arthur Goldhammer trans. 1989);
Franqois Furet, Feudal System, in A CRrTCAL DIcriONARY OF THE FRECCH
REVOLUTION, supra, at 684 [hereinafter Feudal System]; J.Q.C. MACKRELL. THE AT-
TACK ON 'FEUDALISM' IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1973); ALE XIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, THm OLD RGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Stuart Gilbert
trans., 1955) (1856); FRANKLIN L. FORtD, ROBE AND SWORD: THE REGROUPING OF
THE FRENCH ARISTOCRACY AFTER Louis XIV (1953); MARCEL GARAUD, LA
REVOLUrION ET LA L']GALrrt CrviLE (1953); Alfred Cobban, The Parlements of
France in the Eighteenth Century, HISTORY 64 (Feb. & June 1950); SYDNEY HER-
BERT, THE FALL OF FEUDALISM IN FRANCE (1921); ALPHONSE AULARD, LA
RtVOLUrION FRANCAISE Er LE RilGIME FPODAL (1919).
5. On the pre-history of the Code civil, see JEAN-Louis HALP#RIN, L'IMPOSsiBLE
CODE CIVIL (1992); ANDRA-JEAN ARNAUD, LES ORIGINES DOCTRINALES DU CODE
CVIL FRANCAIS (1969). For a collection of essays on various aspects of the Code
civil, see THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMoN-LAw WORLD (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1956). For a collection of important texts related to the drafting and promulga-
tion of the Code civil, see NASSANCE DU CODE CIVIL (Franqois Ewald ed., 1989).
For a study of codification in France from the middle ages through the Revolution,




Moreover, as political evolution continued in the United States,
new developments and understandings were translated into consti-
tutional doctrine through court decision or amendment of the Con-
stitution itself.6 In France, on the other hand, where revolutionary
forces remained active throughout much of the nineteenth century,7
it was the Code civil that became the focus for giving legal expres-
sion to continuing social and economic developments,8 and, as con-
stitutions came and went, it was the Code civil that remained a
constant, stabilizing force for French society.
Although the Code civil and the legal mindset and methodology it
inspired continue to have great importance in France, and the pres-
ent Constitution continues to occupy a problematical position, sig-
nificant developments have taken place since 1945, particularly over
the past twenty-five years, that appear to be undermining the tradi-
tional centrality of the Code civil9 while at the same time elevating
the status and importance of the Constitution and constitutionally-
based decision-making in the political life of the nation.1" As
French society finally moves beyond the social and political divi-
6. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1991) (viewing the American Revolution as a process which began around 1760 and
continued into the early years of the nineteenth century); Bruce Ackerman, Consti-
tutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) (illustrating the embod-
iment of fundamentally new political understandings in the Constitution through
amendment or judicial decision).
7. See FRANCOIS FURET, REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 1770-1880 (Antonia Nevill
trans., 1988). "The French Revolution began in 1789, but there is no clear date for
its end.... Like the American Revolution ... its desire was to found, within the
law, a body politic of free and equal individuals; but the French Revolution was
continually revising the terms of the undertaking .... " Id. at ix.
8. See James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459,
459 (1994) (arguing that the principles of freedom and individual autonomy were
not those of the drafters of the Code civil, but rather "were the principles of French
19th century treatise writers who read them into the Code."). See also JEAN-Louis
HALPIRIN, HIsTOIRE Du DROr PRIVA FRAN(7AIS DEPUIS 1804 (1996); DAwSON,
supra note 4, at 374-431; EUoENE GAUDEMET, L'INTERPRtTATION Du CODE CIVIL
EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1804 (1935); Roscoe Pound, The French Civil Code and the
Spirit of Nineteenth Century Law, 35 B.U. L. REV. 77 (1955). For a collection of
essays on the Code civil after its first one hundred years, see 1 & 2 LE CODE CIVIL,
1804-1904, LIVRE Du CENTENAIRE (1904).
9. Recent developments have in fact limited the scope and devalued the status of
acts of Parliament (lois) in general. French legal scholars use the terms "la crise de
la loi" or "la decadence de la loi" to describe the results of these developments. See
JACQUES GHESTN ET AL., TRAIT DE DRorr CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GtNtIRALE 214-
17 (4th ed. 1994); JEAN-PIERRE GRIDEL, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ET AU DROIT
FRAN4;AIS 661-86 (2d ed. 1994); Franqois Terr6, La "crise de la loi," 25 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 17 (1980).
10. See GRIDEL, supra note 9, at 661-86; ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL
POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE (1992); F.L. Morton, Judicial Review in France: A Comparative Analysis, 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (1988) (comparing constitutional developments in France and
the United States). For a broad-ranging discussion of legal developments in France
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sions of the revolutionary era, and as revolutionary rhetoric and
ways of conceptualizing political and legal issues born during that
period give way to different organizing principles and dialogues," a
new synthesis appears to be in the making whose impact is already
evident in thinking about law and government.12
I offer these ideas in the hope that they will contribute to better
mutual understanding between France and the United States. In my
view, both nations share similar political interests and ideals. They
are natural allies and natural friends. Unfortunately, however, each
has developed a stereotypical view of the other which complicates
their mutual political and economic relations and their cooperation
in these and other areas. While the matters dealt with in this Essay
represent only a small part of the mental make-up of the French and
American people, they are nevertheless important; their exploration
and elucidation will undermine stereotypical thinking thereby fos-
tering mutual understanding and empathy. Also, I do not intend to
praise or criticize the different approaches taken by French and
American society to political, social, and legal organization. Our
sole task here is comparison for purposes of enhancing understand-
ing and communication, not evaluation.
The United States and France are linked by cultural and political
bonds spanning more than two centuries. On the American side,
one thinks of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and Benjamin
Franklin, three of the central figures in the founding of the Ameri-
can Republic.'3 Both Jefferson and Franklin lived and travelled in
since 1958, see JEAN CARBONNIER, DROrr ET PASSION DU DROIT SOUS LA V " RAPUB-
LIQUE (1996).
11. See Ronald Tiersky, Mitterrand's Legacies, FOREIGN AFn., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at
112, 115:
[Mitterrand's] new realism made possible a historic left-right accommo-
dation, expanding the heretofore contested legitimacy of the Fifth Repub-
lic's political institutions and liberal economy. The willingness of both right
and left to abandon France's two-century-old "silent civil war" inspired his-
torians in the mid-1980s to declare that "the French Revolution is finally
over."
Id.; see also STEVEN LAURENCE KAPLAN, FAREWELL, REVOLUTION: DIsPUTED LEG-
ACrES, FRANcn, 1789/1989 (1995).
12. One important example of this new synthesis is the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic of 1958, which reconciles a strong executive with the parliamentary tradi-
tion. For over 150 years, since the Revolution, French government had oscillated
widely between the poles of executive dominance (Bonapartism) and parliamentary
supremacy. For descriptions of these two traditions, see STONE, supra note 10, at 27-
31. The juste milieu, or middle way, proved elusive. It appears that a blueprint for
the juste milieu has now been found. It remains for the French to make it work.
13. See David AJ. Richards, Revolution and Constiutionalism in America and
France, 60 Miss. .J. 311, 313-14 (1990) (discussing the close relationship between
constitutional thought in America and France during the formative period of the
American Constitution, and arguing that "[b]ecause Americans understand their
own revolutionary and constitutional project as... continuous with the events in
France, they are absorbed by those events at the deep level of self-understanding
1997]
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France and were profoundly influenced by their experiences there,
and Thomas Paine, the author of the influential Common Sense,
served as a deputy to the French Convention in 1792. The Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence and Constitution owe much to
eighteenth century French political thinkers: above all to Montes-
quieu (separation of powers), to Rousseau (popular sovereignty),
and to Voltaire (free speech and the separation of church and state).
On the French side, one thinks of Lafayette, who symbolizes, more
than any other person, the profound and historic links between the
two countries.' 4 One thinks also of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose
ideas about American political and social life seem remarkably con-
temporary even today, after more than 150 years.
Certainly, there are conflicts and disagreements between the
United States and France today as there have been in the past. Our
modem difficulties find their analogue even before 1800 in the XYZ
Affair, which soured Franco-American diplomatic relations,' 5 and in
the "undeclared war" or "half war" during which American war-
ships attacked French vessels in the Caribbean.'6 Today, tensions
between the United States and France cover a broad range of issues:
for example, France makes no secret of its desire to see American
military and political leadership in Europe replaced by European
preeminence; differences in the economic area are recurring; and
the French are concerned with protecting their language and culture
from perceived American encroachments.' 7
France and the United States are confronted by different geopo-
litical realities and have had different historical experiences that
lead each nation to approach problems in different ways. 18 The se-
curity afforded the United States by its ocean fortress, coupled with
its immense natural and human resources, gives rise to far different
perspectives on international security and economic organization
and relations from that of France, whose close proximity to powerful
and often threatening neighbors has made it the target of full-scale
that links the political legitimacy of their own project with that of France"; see also
YVON BIZARDEL, LES AMtRICAINS A PARIS PENDANT LA RPEVOLUTION (1972).
14. For a discussion of Lafayette that links his revolutionary experiences in
America and France, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 24-29 (1989). See also Patrice Gueniffey, Lafayette, in A CRITICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 224; Philippe Raynaud,
American Revolution, in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION,
supra note 4, at 593.
15. See WILLIAM STINCHCOMBE, THE XYZ AFFAIR (1980).
16. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLO.
MACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801 (1966).
17. See RICHARD F. KUISEL, SEDUCING THE FRENCH: THE DILEMMA OF AMERI.
CANIZATION (1993).
18. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 119-20, 228-31, 235, 602-06, 618-19, 822-
23 (1994); see also HENRY KISSINGER, THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-AP.
PRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 41-64 (1965).
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armed invasion three times in the past 125 years.' 9 For example,
one can view Gaullist insistence on an independent foreign policy
and military self-sufficiency perhaps as the French version of the
"never again" attitude. Rather than an arrogant and idiosyncratic
assertion of national pride and independence, as many Americans
would have it, French defense policy is simply a logical response to
an uncertain and dangerous world where a nation would be foolish
to rely on the help of others for its national security. On the domes-
tic side, the highly centralized political and administrative systems
that are characteristic of France, and are so different from American
federalism, again represent reasonable responses to the centrifugal
forces which so plagued France throughout its history.
On the philosophical level, France and the United States have dif-
ferent traditions which often lead to different ways of conceptualiz-
ing problems and articulating solutions.' The French Cartesian
tradition places a premium on abstract thinking with a correspond-
ing lack of attention to empirical detail;21 American pragmatism has
an instinctive distrust of abstraction and values actual experience.
The French present solutions to problems as logical deductions from
more fundamental principles, while Americans prefer to reason and
argue from concrete examples and actual outcomes in prior situa-
tions. To Americans, French rationalism may appear sterile and re-
moved from reality; to the French, American pragmatism may
appear unprincipled, unsystematic, and superficial.
France's tradition of Cartesian rationality may be regarded as an
apt expression of certain French cultural traits that inform and struc-
ture interpersonal and organizational relationships. As Michel Cro-
zier points out in his classic study, personal and group interrelations
in France are characterized by "individual isolation and lack of con-
structive co-operative activities on the one side, strata isolation and
lack of communication between people of different rank on the
other.. . ."I Because these basic cultural traits lead to "fears of
conflict and of face-to-face relationships,"' "the ideal pattern of de-
cision-making in France ... present[s] the qualities of rationality,
19. See P. Terrence Hopmann, French Perspectives on International Relations Af-
ter the Cold War, 38 MERSHON INT'L STUD. REV. 69 (1994); David P. Calleo & Alex
T. Lau, eds., France in the New European and World Order, 13 SAIS REv. (Special
Issue, Fall 1993).
20. For a discussion of the need to understand the intellectual background, or
basic conceptual framework, of a foreign culture in order to understand its legal
culture, see William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try
a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889 (1995).
21. For a discussion of the influence of Descartes on legal thought in France, see
MIcHmL VILLEY, LA FORMATION DE LA PENStE JURIDIOUE MODERNE 552-79 (4th
ed. 1975).
22. MICHEL CROZIER, THE Bu EucRATIc PHENOMENON 218 (1964). See also
id at 209-314.
23. Id at 253.
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impersonality, and absoluteness that fit the basic French cultural
traits."'24 Crozier contrasts these tendencies with the English-speak-
ing tradition which "allows greater individual leeway in the use of
power and more active participation by subordinates."'  "In an
American organization, individuals do not remain isolated as they
do in a French one. It is easier for them to co-operate, and they do
not try to avoid face-to-face relationships. Centralization, therefore,
is not necessary to smooth over human relations."2 6
At the legal level, too, there are important differences between
the French and American systems that often lead to incomprehen-
sion, surprise, and criticism. Professor Dama~ka provides a useful
framework for considering some of these differences. 27 He con-
trasts two "composite structures of authority": the "hierarchical
ideal or vision of officialdom" and the "coordinate ideal. '28 The hi-
erarchical structure "essentially corresponds to conceptions of class-
ical bureaucracy. It is characterized by a professional corps of
officials, organized into a hierarchy which makes decisions accord-
ing to technical standards."29 The coordinate structure "is defined
by a body of nonprofessional decision makers, organized into a sin-
gle level of authority which makes decisions by applying undifferen-
tiated community standards."30 Each structure has important
implications for decision-making procedures.3' Professor Damagka
also identifies two types of states, or two "contrasting dispositions of
government: the disposition to manage society and the disposition
merely to provide a framework for social interaction. '32 He calls
the former the "activist state," in which the goal of legal proceedings
is the implementation of state policy, and the latter the "reactive
state," in which the goal of legal proceedings is the resolution of
conflict. 33 Each orientation has important procedural and substan-
tive implications for a legal system. 4 While neither system approxi-
mates either ideal, the American legal system partakes of more
characteristics of the "coordinate" and "reactive" model, while the
24. 1& at 252.
25. Id. at 232.
26. Id. at 234. For a discussion of the impact of the attitudes discussed in this
paragraph on the economic sector in France, see FRANCaS FUKUYAMA, TRUST. THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 113-25 (1995).
27. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, TiH FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHOITv: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986). See also Mirjan R.
Damagka, Reflections on American Constitutionalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 421 (Supp.
1990).
28. Itt at 17.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Itt at 47-70.
32. Id at 71.
33. See id. at 73-88.
34. Id. at 90-180.
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French legal system more closely resembles the "hierarchical" and
"activist" model.35
Moreover, even when French and Americans use the same termi-
nology to articulate values, the substantive content or operational
referents often differ. Michel Crozier points out, for example, that
while among the core political beliefs of both American and West-
ern European societies are freedom of the individual, equality, or-
der and efficiency, and dualism, Americans and Europeans
understand these concepts differently.36 For instance, Crozier sees
an
opposition between the European conception of freedom-
which is a sort of freedom-from, that is, emphasizing the ina-
lienable right of the individual not to be interfered with-and
the American one-which is rather a freedom-to, that is, the
inalienable right to take initiatives and to lead others if they so
wish.37
As for equality, "European egalitarianism... shows again a differ-
ence from the American variety. It is still a stratified kind of egali-
tarianism. People may require equality with their peers most
punctiliously while they may accept inequality between statuses and
strata. '38 As for order and efficiency,
[w]henever the development of freedom threatens to bring
chaos, the demand for order is immediate, even violent....
The special West European form of order, however, has a
more social and less juridical connotation than in the United
States. Things (and people) have to be put in their proper
place for society to operate. Due process is not the cardinal
element of this belief. ... Order is the way to achieve effi-
ciency, which is the condition of a well-functioning society.
West Europeans still value the good "efficient" scheme more
than the concrete results.39
35. See BEATmic FRY HYSLOP, FRENCH NATIONALISM IN 1789 ACCoRDINO TO
Tm GENERAL CAHIERS (Octagon Books 1968) (1934). The author identifies Itat-
isme as a key element in French nationalism.
Etatisme means the supremacy of the secular state over individuals or
groups within its jurisdiction. This involves an exalting of the state and an
enlargement of its functions. Etatisme is opposed to both the feudal and
the clerical concept of the state, to any doctrine of plural sovereignty, and it
is also opposed to the liberal concept of the state as a "passive policeman,"
a "necessary evil."
Id. at 26.
36. See generally MicHEL CROZIER ET A., THE CRISIS OF DENtocRAcv 39-59
(1975).
37. Id. at 44.
38. Id. See also Cynthia A. Vroom, Equal Protection Versus the Principle of
Equality: American and French Views on Equality in the Law, 21 CAP. U. L REv.
199 (1992).
39. CROZIER ET AL, supra note 36, at 45.
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Notwithstanding the historical, philosophical, cultural, and sys-
temic differences just discussed, and despite the periods of turbu-
lence throughout our 200-year relationship, French and American
political and legal values and institutions are strikingly similar in
many important respects. Indeed, the French and American revolu-
tions, guided by the principles of democracy, respect for the rule of
law, and the inalienable rights of man, together mark the transition
from the old world to the new.40 The political and legal documents
that emerged from this period on both sides of the Atlantic, such as
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of
Rights in the United States, and la Ddclaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen, the French Constitution of 1791, and the
Code civil in France, embody many of the same lofty ideals and legal
standards. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries both
countries have been engaged in the defense and advancement of
these ideals on the domestic and international plane. Many times
during the twentieth century, whether in full-scale war or in United
Nations operations, American and French soldiers have fought side
by side in support of these ideals that have their source in the revo-
lutionary period.
In the following sections of this Essay, I will discuss the centrality
of the Constitution and the idea of "constitutionality" in the Ameri-
can political and legal system, and then compare it with the role of
the Constitution in French society. I will also discuss current legal,
political, and social developments in France which may be harb-
ingers of a new way of looking at law and government that accords
heightened importance to the Constitution and to constitutional
adjudication.4
II. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Since the legal centrality, political symbolism, and social impor-
tance of the Constitution are often taken for granted in the United
States, that is to say, we simply assume that the position the Consti-
tution occupies here is inherent in any system that has a written con-
stitution, it is important to highlight just how unique the American
experience really has been. Many of the features that Americans
associate with constitutionalism simply do not exist elsewhere. It is
40. But see PATRICE HIGoNNET, SISTER REPUBLICS: THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH
AND AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 1-10 (1988) (pointing out significant differences
between the ideologies animating the French and American revolutions and their
differing legacies to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
41. This Essay will not deal with the Code civil. There is abundant literature on
the Code which supports the point of view of the Code expressed in this Essay. See
sources cited supra notes 1 and 5. For a broader perspective on the subject, see
JEROME BLUM, THE END OF THE OLD ORDER IN RURAL EUROPE (1978). But see
Gordley, supra note 8.
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worthwhile, therefore, to describe some of those features before
considering and contrasting the French experience.
A. American constitutionalism defined and described
American constitutionalism is based on the idea that the proce-
dures, substantive provisions, and fundamental principles of the
Constitution comprise the nation's preeminent political and legal
values. The Constitution is not one among several sources of such
values, but is the undisputed, ultimate fount of the fundamental
principles, values, and procedures according to which American so-
ciety is constituted and functions. It is not only the supreme source
of positive law in the American legal system, but is also the principal
symbol of national unity, of national values, and of the nation itself.
The loyalty of Americans to the procedures, substantive provisions,
and fundamental constitutional ideas is the ideological glue that
binds together American political and social life. The Constitution
is "[t]he foundation of our society .... . 42 Commenting on the Con-
stitution in America, Michel Crozier remarks: "There is something
admirable and touching about the awe Americans feel toward their
Constitution, whose principles they internalize more thoroughly
than any other nation in history." 3 Carl Friedrich says, "In
America,. . . constitutionalism struck deeper root than almost any-
where else on earth .... ,44
In America the idea of constitutionalism is intimately attached to,
and in fact inseparable from, the actual written Constitution of the
country.45 Constitutionalism is not a vague concept calling for the
separation and limitation of public power, the rights of the gov-
erned, and adherence to certain time-honored procedures, customs,
and values.' It has rather an immediacy and a tangibility, and an
42. EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF You CAN KEEP IT 165 (1972).
43. MICHEL CROZIER, THE TROUBLE WITH AMERICA 99 (Peter Heinegg trans.,
1984).
44. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GovERNMiErr AND DENtociAcy:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 28 (4th ed. 1968). For a histori-
cal background of constitutionalism, see FRANCIS D. WoR.ztrH, THE ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1949).
45. For a discussion of the relationship between constitutionalism and constitu-
tions, see WLtAM G. ANDREwS, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 21-23
(3d ed. 1968).
46. See CHARLEs HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONsTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND
MODERN (rev. ed. 1947).
[Clonstitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on gov-
ernment; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic gov-
ernment, the government of will instead of law.... [T]he most lasting of
the essentials of true constitutionalism still remains what it has been almost




association with a particular document, which is usually lacking even
in other constitutional democracies.
The Constitution provides the framework for the political and
legal discourse within which the most important questions of Ameri-
can life are debated and resolved.47 The Constitution also contains
the specific provisions that are applicable in the particular cases that
come before judicial and administrative officials for decision. Even-
tually almost all such questions are submitted to courts for resolu-
tion in light of constitutional principles. Thus, final decisions about
such important questions as abortion, the death penalty, desegrega-
tion and affirmative action, freedom of speech, the press, and reli-
gion, as well as economic doctrine and political structure are made
by the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court acting as
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution.
Interest in the Constitution is not limited to the courts. It perme-
ates all levels of society. The same comment that Alexis de Toc-
queville made more than 150 years ago with respect to law in
general could be repeated with equal truth regarding the role of the
Constitution in American political life and discourse:
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that
is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence
all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies,
the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceed-
ings. As most public men are or have been legal practitioners,
they introduce the customs and technicalities of their profes-
sion into the management of public affairs. The jury extends
this habit to all classes. The language of the law thus becomes,
in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which
is produced in the schools and courts of justice, gradually pen-
etrates beyond their walls into the bosom of society, where it
47. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law,
71 N.C. L. REV. 949 (1993) (analyzing the Constitution not as a set of rules creating
and organizing the federal government, but as a document that inspired political
debate and the culture out of which our notions and understandings of constitution-
alism grew); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S Discorrnr: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 108 (1996) ("[Cjonstitutional discourse has come
to define the terms of political discourse in American public life."); SANFORD LEVIN.
SON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
[I]t is obvious to anyone observing American political culture that much of
our disputation is in some sense organized around constitutional catego-
ries. What in most other political systems is described simply as a "polit-
ical" contretemps in our system tends to take on "constitutional" overtones,
precisely because the Constitution is viewed as a way of structuring politics,
of setting rules for the activity.
l at 27. "Constitutional law provides a public vocabulary absolutely essential to
understanding the nature of political discourse within our society." Id at 168. "The
Constitution is a linguistic system, what some among us might call a discourse." Id.
at 19. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF:
THE CoNSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
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descends to the lowest classes, so that the whole people con-
tract the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate. s
B. The Constitution as a "canonical" text
The present Constitution of the United States entered into force
in 1788, soon after the thirteen American colonies gained indepen-
dence from British rule. Since the ratification of the Constitution in
1788, the United States has had only one Constitution.4 9 It is now
the oldest extant Constitution in the world. Moreover, this Consti-
tution has been amended just twenty-seven times. The first ten
amendments were added in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was added
to the Constitution. These amendments are really part of the origi-
nal Constitution, as their adoption was proposed during the ratifica-
tion process and this prospect was regarded as necessary to assure
the ratification of the Constitution itself. Thus, in over two hundred
years, the Constitution has been amended a mere seventeen times:
an average of once every fifteen years. In addition, the vast major-
ity of these later amendments have affected neither the fundamental
structure of the government nor the fundamental values expressed
in the Constitution. The original Constitution including the first ten
amendments, then, is of such great antiquity, relatively speaking,
that it has in fact attained canonical status.50
In addition, besides its antiquity, continuity, and textual stability,
the Constitution functions as a quasi-religious document, as the tan-
gible embodiment of American "civil religion." In this respect, as
Thomas Grey points out, the Constitution resembles scripture and
constitutional law... represents the elucidation of the under-
lying collective mystery by a guild of priests, who draw out the
deep meanings of the sacred document by esoteric hermeneu-
tic methods. The institutional charisma bestowed by initiation
into the priesthood ... gives these interpretations their legiti-
macy.... The Constitution resembles the Bible of the new
theologians-a sacred text indirectly representing an ineffable
underlying reality.5'
Moreover, according to Professor Grey,
48. 1 ALE.us DE TocQUEvuLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERiCA 280 (Phillips Bradley,
trans. 1945).
49. It is also possible to regard the Articles of Confederation as the first Ameri-
can Constitution, with the present Constitution thus being the second American
Constitution.
50. But see DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBuct How TiE CoNsTnTTnoN
Is PARALYZING DEMOCRACY 9 (1996) (arguing that only by rewriting the Constitu-
tion can America address its current problems: "Rather than submitting to an im-
mutable Constitution, Americans should cast off their chains and rethink their
society from the ground up.").
51. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L REv. 1, 23 (1984).
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The Constitution's symbolic function is most clearly manifest
in the third clause of article VI, which requires that all state
and federal officers must swear or affirm "to support the Con-
stitution." . . . [T]he Framers considered the constitutional
oath a substitute for the religious tests the colonists were famil-
iar with under the English established church. To push the
point a bit: America would have no national church,... yet
the worship of the Constitution would serve the unifying func-
tion of a national civil religion.52
C. The Constitution as "codification" of formative American
ideals
The American Constitution was drafted during the immediate af-
termath of a revolutionary period, a period during which the coun-
try forged a new national identity. The Constitution might thus be
described as the "codification" of the most important ideas and in-
sights of the revolutionary period and also of the tumultuous post-
revolutionary period when the newly independent states were un-
able to establish a political structure that was adequate to the needs
of the time. Americans at the time had a vivid sense of what they
had accomplished. There was a contemporary awareness among all
Americans that the Constitution had actually created a political sys-
tem "'so novel, so complex, and intricate' that writing about it would
never cease."53 "The Constitution had become the climax of a great
revolution.... Americans now told themselves with greater assur-
ance than ever that they had created something remarkable in the
history of politics." 54
The document is then a self-conscious reaction to the most press-
ing problems of the preceding regimes. Unlike the situation in
France where concerns of political and legal reformers focused on
the abolition of the remnants of the feudal system, 5 political leaders
52. Id at 18. See also SANFORD LEVINSON, supra note 47, passim.
53. JAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, at v (1791), quoted in GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 593 (1969).
54. WOOD, supra note 53. See also id. at 614 ("The Americans of the Revolution-
ary generation believed that they had made a momentous contribution to the history
of politics. They had for the first time demonstrated to the world how a people
could diagnose the ills of its society and work out a peaceable process of cure.").
55. [Tihe expression "feudal system" refers to a system of human relations
which gradually established itself in western Europe after the Germanic
invasions and which was based on the vassalage contract and the fief. It
connotes the network of hierarchies and dependences that grew up among
free, private individuals with the decay of public authority. By way of the
fief, the lord and his vassal committed themselves to a mutual relation of
protection and service.
Feudal System, supra note 4, at 684. See also 1 MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY:
THE GROWTH OF TIES OF DEPENDENCE (L.A. Manyon trans. 1961); 2 MARC
BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY: SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (L.A.
Manyon trans. 1961); supra note 5.
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in the former colonies focused almost exclusively on the organiza-
tion and control of public power. The United States had never ex-
perienced the feudal system. 56 It was not the abuse of privilege and
power by an aristocracy or organized religion that provoked the
American war of independence, but rather heavy-handed political
rule from England. The American colonists complained about their
exclusion from the decision-making process concerning important
issues that touched their lives, above all in the commercial and fiscal
domains. They were incensed that these decisions were made in
England, principally to advance English economic interests. They
were also angered by restrictions on freedom of speech and the
press and by the lack of respect that English authorities showed for
other civil liberties. The Declaration of Independence of 1776 con-
tained a list of eighteen specific grievances against the King of Eng-
land; all dealt with the abuse of public power. The public debate
that preceded the American Revolution focused on the appropriate
organization of public power and on the protection of civil liberties.
Further imperatives for successful union became apparent when
the colonies unsuccessfully attempted to implement the structure for
united government represented by the Articles of Confederation.
Once again, these matters pertained primarily to political, commer-
cial, and fiscal relations, rather than to underlying economic or so-
cial structures.57 While economic decline (due in large part to
protectionist and retaliatory measures adopted by the states) and
ineffective diplomacy were perhaps the two most visible problems of
the period, thoughtful observers were also troubled by the tendency
of state legislative bodies to pursue their narrow self-interests. "An
excess of power in the people was leading not simply to licentious-
ness but to a new kind of tyranny... by the people themselves-
what John Adams in 1776 had called ... a democratic despotism."5S
The revolutionary and post-revolutionary concerns of Americans
informed the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. It was
these documents, then, that gave legal structure to the political aspi-
rations of the American people as they developed in the crucible of
the revolutionary struggle against Great Britain and later in the dif-
56. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERMCA: AN INTERPRETA-
TION OF A~mRICAN PoLITIcAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3-32 (1955). Pa-
trice Higonnet remarks that "[p]rerevolutionary France was a social and ideological
inversion of the thirteen colonies." HiGONNET, supra note 40, at S.
57. See EDMuND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLtC 1763-89, at 112-27
(Daniel . Boostin ed., rev. ed. 1977); WOOD, supra note 53, at 393-429 (1969); AN.
DREW C. McLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTrTUTON 1783-1789.
at 48-118 (1962). See also Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the
Making of the Constitution, in BEYoND CONFFDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND AhmRICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69 (Richard Beeman, et al. eds.,
1987).
58. WOOD, supra note 53, at 404.
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ficult early years of independence. 59 Thus the Constitution (includ-
ing the Bill of Rights) expresses in concrete form the political
identity and aspirations of the American people that developed dur-
ing the formative period of the American Republic. The three great
principles that find expression in the Constitution are democracy,
self-government, and liberty.6" Later, after the Civil War, an addi-
tional fundamental idea, equality, was introduced by the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 It is these ideas (democracy, self-government, lib-
erty, and equality) that represent the leitmotifs or themes of Ameri-
can political life and discourse, and it is the Constitution that
expresses and symbolizes them.
D. The Constitution and national solidarity
During the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century and during
the first third of the twentieth century, millions of immigrants ar-
rived in the United States. The population of the United States in-
creased from about 31 million persons in 1860 to about 106 million
persons in 1920.62 The immigrants came from many countries and
59. See CLINTON RossITER, THE AMERICAN QUEST 1790-1860: AN EMERGING
NATION IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY, UNITY, AND MODERNITY 261 (1971) ("The writ-
ing, ratifying, and launching of this most successful of national charters [the Consti-
tution] in 1787-1789 was the principal action in uniting the American people and
setting a stage for the search for modernity."); see also John M. Murrin, A Roof
Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDER-
ATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra
note 57, at 333 (stressing the differences between the colonies during the revolution-
ary period, the non-inevitability of the "creation and triumph of the United States,"
id. at 339, arguing that "American national identity was ... an unexpected, im-
promptu, artificial, and therefore extremely fragile creation of the Revolution," id.
at 34, and characterizing the Constitution as an ingenious contrivance that enabled a
precarious experiment to continue for another generation or two," id. at 348).
60. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM 380-88 (1993).
61. See GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETrYSBURO: THE WORDS THAT REMADE
AMERICA (1992):
[In the Gettysburg Address Lincoln] not only put the Declaration [of Inde-
pendence] in a new light as a matter of founding law, but put its central
proposition, equality, in a newly favored position as a principle of the Con-
stitution .... What had been a mere theory of lawyers like James Wilson,
Joseph Story, and Daniel Webster-that the nation preceded the states, in
time and importance-now became a lived reality of the American tradi-
tion.... [The] people was "conceived" in 1776, "brought forth" as an entity
whose birth was datable ("four score and seven" years back) and placeable
("on this continent"), something that could receive a "new birth of
freedom."
By giving this language a place in our sacred documents, Lincoln
changed the way people thought about the Constitution.
Id. at 145-46.
62. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1994, at 360-61 (1995). France,
like the United States, is a country where a substantial proportion of the population
has immigrant roots. Donald L. Horowitz, Immigration and Group Relations in
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from all economic and social levels. The earlier generations of
Americans and the new arrivals shared neither a common history,
nor a common culture, nor a common religion. How could the
United States retain, and hopefully deepen, its political and social
unity in the face of such ethnic, social, religious, and economic di-
versity in the population? This task fell to the Constitution, as the
embodiment of the "American Creed," the fundamental ideas of
American life.6 3 To be an American was not to share a common
past experience or to possess common attributes in the present (like
language or culture). It was, rather to believe in the fundamental
ideas of the Constitution as guiding principles of action and of
aspiration.64
France and America, in IMMIGRANTS IN Two DEMocRAaEs: FRENCt AND A.tERi.
CAN EXPERIENCE 3, 5-7 (Donald L. Horowitz & Gdrard Noiriel eds. 1992). The
importance of immigrant experience in the formation of the respective national
identities of the two countries, however, differs significantly.
For a long time in France, immigrants were absent from the collective
memory, whereas in the United States they were omnipresent .... In both
cases, however, this opposition is related to the way that nation's founda-
tional myths were forged and promoted by the state. In the United States,
immigrants were from the outset agents of national construction, whereas
in France, they arrived massively after national unity had been achieved.
G.RARD NOIRIEL, THE FRENCH MELTING Po-: IMMIGRATION, CMZENSHIP, AND
NATIONAL IDENTrTY at xxii (Geoffrey de Laforcade trans. 1996); see also id. at 6-10,
257-61.
63. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DiI-NixtA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM%1 AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 8 (1944) (coining the term "American Creed" and stating:
"The American Creed is a humanistic liberalism developing out of the epoch of
Enlightenment when America received its national consciousness and its political
structure.... For practical purposes the main norms of the American Creed as
usually pronounced are centered in the belief in equality and in the rights to lib-
erty."). See also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN PoLTICS: THE PROMISE OF
DISHP NRoNT (1981) (especially chapter 2, entitled "The American Creed and Na-
tional Identity").
64. See HANS KoHN, AMERICAN NAnONALISM: AN INTERPRE TVE ESSAY
(1957):
When the war ended with the victory of the revolutionaries in the thirteen
colonies.., a new nation was born. The tie which united it-and separated
it at the same time from other nations-was not founded on the common
attributes of nationhood-language, cultural tradition, historical territory
or common descent-but on an idea which singled out the new nation
among the nations of the earth.
What was this idea? It has found its expression in the Constitution and in
the Bill of Rights, documents which have shown an astonishing persistency
and vitality.... For the American Constitution is unlike any other: it
represents the lifeblood of the American nation, its supreme symbol and
manifestation.... It draws its lasting strength not from what it says but
from what it is: the embodiment of the idea by which the United States was
constituted .... To become an American has always meant to identify




On the most general level, notions of justice and individualism lie
at the heart of the "American Creed" as it finds expression in the
Constitution. The Constitution represents for Americans the prom-
ise of fair treatment and the recognition of the individual worth of
every person. There does not exist, as in Europe, a high awareness
of social and economic stratification. The dominant ideology in the
United States is that each person can advance to the full extent of
his talents and ambition. The principal function of government is
the protection of this liberty of individual action. One does not
count on the state for assistance; one asks of the state, rather, to
refrain from action that inhibits or constrains individual initiative.
The original Constitution as ratified in 1788 purports to speak in
the name of "We the People of the United States." But, as is well
known, the Constitution as originally adopted was (almost fatally)
flawed by its failure to include a significant number of inhabitants
within the body politic. Even though the Constitution was ostensi-
bly adopted by "We the People of the United States," it did not
encompass within its embrace the slave population.65 Moreover, the
constituting sovereign, the "We the People of the United States,"
was an ambiguous reference to either the undifferentiated people of
the United States acting as a collective or to the people as grouped
in their different states.66 Supporting the so-called compact theory
of the Constitution (that is, that the Constitution was brought into
force by the vote of the several states rather than by the people of
the United States as a whole), was Article VII: "The Ratification of
the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establish-
ment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same."67
It took the Civil War to finally give an inclusive, national content
to the phrase "We the People." That occurred definitively with the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment that altered fundamentally
the American social contract represented by the Constitution. With
regard to expressing national solidarity, then, the Constitution that
emerged from the Civil War period was a far different document
than the Constitution of the Founding Fathers.
65. See Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a
Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra note 57 at 188. Finkelman argues that
the Constitution as adopted was fundamentally imperfect; the Union was made
more perfect "[o]nly after four years of unparalleled bloodshed [1861-1865] ... by
finally expunging slavery from the Constitution." Id at 225.
66. See BEER, supra note 60, at 308-40 (1993).
67. U.S. CONT. art. VII; see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,
1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see BEER, supra note 60, at 327 (arguing
that "the Constitution was not made or ratified by the states as sovereignties or
political communities but was rather adopted in state conventions, by 'the immedi-
ate representatives of the people."').
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The concept of a national citizenship dates only from this time.6
The lack of inclusivity of the concept before the Civil War was made
distressingly clear by the Supreme Court in its Dred Scott decision.69
According to Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court,
It is true, every person, and every class and description of
persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion recognised as citizens in the several States, became also
citizens of this new political body [the United States]; but none
other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity,
but for no one else....
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of
the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, show, that neither the class of persons who had
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they
had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of
the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument.70
The Fourteenth Amendment, added to the Constitution in 1868,
reversed the Dred Scott decision by proclaiming: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. '71 Not only did the Fourteenth Amendment introduce
the concept of national citizenship into the Constitution, it also
worked a fundamental change in the legal relationship between the
states and the federal government. Thus, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment placed direct restrictions on the power of the states' and em-
powered Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this [Amendment]." 73
Since the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole, with each
provision read in the context of all other relevant provisions, the
Fourteenth Amendment has a significant bearing on the interpreta-
tion of the language "We the People of the United States." With the
establishment of national citizenship and the allocation of substan-
tial powers to the federal government to oversee the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial activities of the states, the Constitution as
68. For a discussion of the concept of citizenship and the Constitution, see ALEx.
ANDER M. BiCKEL, THm MoRALrry OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975). See also WARREN,
supra note 42, at 33-48.
69. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
70. Id at 406-07.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See BICKEL, supra note 68, at 40-41.
72. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any per-
son the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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amended expressed a very different idea of the national community
than the Constitution of the Founding Fathers.
One further matter concerning the ratification of the Constitution
deserves comment. It is well known that there was considerable
contemporary opposition to the ratification of the Constitution.7 a
Ratification was not a foregone conclusion. In the key state of New
York, for example, proponents of the Constitution argued long and
hard for ratification. The Federalist was written as part of that ef-
fort. It is remarkable then that almost immediately after ratifica-
tion, virtually all Americans rallied to the Constitution. "[N]o
anticonstitutional party emerged in the new United States. As early
as the spring of 1791 the Constitution was accepted on all sides as
the starting point for further debates .... While interest in funda-
mental amendments persisted for years, determined opposition to
the new plan of government disappeared almost as quickly as it
arose."7 And The Federalist soon acquired "a talismanic status in
American constitutional interpretation."76 The response of Ameri-
cans to their new Constitution was thus extremely different from the
French experience at the time of the Revolution and at later times
when new constitutions were adopted.77
E. The Constitution as a voluntary social compact
Besides expressing the political ideas and ideals of the American
people, the Constitution probably resembles more closely than any
74. See, e.g., Steven R. Boyd, Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitu-
tion: Pennsylvania, 1787-1792, PUBLIUS, Spring 1977, at 123, reprinted in THE FOR.
MATION AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUrION: MAJOR HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATIONS, at 78-92 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1987) [hereinafter FORMATION AND
RATIFICATION]; Robin Brooks, Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and the Rati-
fication of the Constitution in New York, 24 WM. & MARY L.Q. 339 (1967), reprinted
in FORMATION AND RATIFICATION, supra at 93; Albert Ray Newsome, North Caro-
lina's Ratification of the Federal Constitution, 17 N.C. HIsT. REV. 287 (1940), re-
printed in FORMATION AND RATIFICATION, supra at 475.
75. Lance Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution,
1789 to 1793, 31 WM. & MARY L.Q. 167, 167-68 (1974), reprinted in FORMATION
AND RATIFICATION, supra note 74, at 39-40.
76. James W. Ducayet, Publius and Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The
Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 821, 821 (1993).
77. See infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text. According to Lance Banning:
Too little thought has been given to this remarkable turn of events, and
its most peculiar feature remains to be explained. Revolutionary France
tried six constitutions in fifteen years. Most of a century of civil strife lay
behind the constitutional consensus of eighteenth-century England. The
quick apotheosis of the American Constitution was a phenomenon without
parallel in the western world. Nowhere has fundamental constitutional
change been accepted with so much ease. Nowhere have so many fierce
opponents of a constitutional revision been so quickly transformed into an
opposition that claimed to be more loyal than the government itself.
FORMATION AND RATIFICATION, supra note 74, at 40.
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comparable document in history a social compact voluntarily en-
tered into by the people. Virtually all the present inhabitants of the
United States or their ancestors (with the important and notable ex-
ceptions of native Americans, African:Americans, and a number of
persons of Hispanic descent)7" freely chose to migrate to and to re-
main in America for the perceived advantages that America had to
offer.
In addition to voluntary presence in the United States, those per-
sons who seek naturalization, that is, to become American citizens,
must swear in open court "to support the Constitution of the United
States" and "to support and defend the Constitution and the laws of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."' 9 This
too is a voluntary act, representing a freely made choice to become
an American citizen.80
It is, of course, true that a large area of the present-day United
States, that represented by the eleven Confederate states, is part of
the national union by reason of conquest rather than volition. With
this area in mind, as well as the blacks, native Americans, and His-
panics who are Americans by compulsion and not by free choice, it
might be said that the notion of the Constitution as a voluntary so-
cial compact fails to describe the experience of a significant part of
America and a significant number of Americans. From this point of
view, the notion of the Constitution as a voluntary social compact is
indeed a myth, obscuring a contentious and often bloody reality.
Nevertheless, the great influx of immigrants, persons clearly choos-
ing to be Americans, since the end of the Civil War, coupled with
the great social and geographic mobility of Americans that has been
a constant feature of the American experience, has done much to
soften our sometimes harsh historical reality, and to entrench the
myth of voluntary association in the American mind.
The American experience, and perhaps more to the point, the
contemporary American view of that experience, is in marked con-
trast to that of most other nations where citizenship in a nation-state
is determined primarily by the frontiers that the particular state was
able to establish in its often centuries-long efforts to pacify given
regions and to bring outlying areas within its domain. In this re-
spect, nation-states like England, Spain, France, Germany, and Italy
are more the result of dynastic combinations or the domination and
conquest of populations than the voluntary choice of individuals to
78. See EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, AMERICANS: A COLLISION OF HISTORIES (1996)
(stressing the historic and contemporary conflicts in American society between
whites, blacks, and Native Americans).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(1) & (3) (1994).
80. For a discussion of the origin of the idea of "volitional allegiance" in the
United States, see JAjis H. KEITNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZEN-
smP, 1608-1870, at 173-209 (1978). See also WERNER SoLLO.s. BEYOND EThiNIc.
rrY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
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become citizens of England, Spain, France, Germany, or Italy. Lan-
guage, culture, and ethnicity, of course, play important roles in the
formation of attachments of individuals to their particular nation, as
do common, collective experiences once a particular nation-state
comes into existence. Nonetheless, contrary to the common view in
the United States, the basis for attachment in these and other coun-
tries is not the free, voluntary, and affirmative election of a particu-
lar form of government and certain political and social values as
expressed in a particular document.
F. The Constitution as an operative document
The real genius of the American constitutional system lies in the
operational reality of the ideas, procedures, and rules embodied in
the Constitution. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the
American Constitution is that it is applied everyday in the courts as
a source of law. There is no special constitutional court in the
United States with the special charge of applying the Constitution,
as there is in France. Also, again differing from the situation in
France, constitutional review in the United States is not limited to a
certain time period. In the United States, provisions of the Consti-
tution can be applied by any court in any matter at any time. If a
court determines that a law or administrative action conflicts with a
constitutional provision, the court must defer to the Constitution
and overturn the law or administrative action in question. One
American historian has remarked that perhaps the greatest achieve-
ment of the authors of the Constitution was to make the Constitu-
tion the supreme law of the land and to require the courts to apply
it.8 This dual directive stems from the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, which not only accords supremacy to the Constitution
and federal laws and treaties, but also obliges judges to apply these
sources.
82
Courts have not been reluctant to give operational effect to their
views of constitutional requirements. Utilizing open-ended provi-
sions like the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, federal courts have created vast bodies of
substantive law, sometimes engaging in activity that is clearly legis-
lative in nature, and fashioning remedies and executive capacity to
implement their views of constitutional requirements in specific
cases. For example, in an effort to end racial segregation in public
81. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 57, at 166-67.
82. Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution sets forth:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
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schools, federal courts redrew the boundaries of local school dis-
tricts and required cities to use busing.s3 Federal courts have also
taken charge of mental hospitals and prisons to protect the rights of
those held in those facilities.' The federal courts have assumed
management of the federal electoral system to give effect to the con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to vote.s To accomplish these tasks,
which frequently require ongoing oversight and management, fed-
eral courts have developed administrative tools to assure that their
interpretations of the Constitution are enforced.
G. The federal judiciary: guardians of the Constitution
While it is indeed possible for a state court to apply a provision of
the Constitution, the Constitution finds its most frequent application
in federal courts. In order to appreciate fully the American consti-
tutional system in operation, it is necessary to be aware of the spe-
cial character of the federal judiciary. It is this special character that
predisposes and allows federal judges to act effectively as staunch
defenders of constitutional rights against encroachments by the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of the federal government and the
states. The most important thing to understand about the federal
judiciary is that federal judges are for the most part persons of very
high ability, accomplishment, and status. They are usually named to
the bench after having achieved great professional success as law-
yers, government officials, or law professors. The lawyers, govern-
ment officials, and law professors who become federal judges are
among the most capable and distinguished of their peers, often hav-
ing played important roles in the politics or economy of their state
or region. 6 Equally important is that, according to the Constitution
itself, once nominated, confirmed, and appointed, federal judges
serve for life." The federal judiciary is, therefore, composed of
strong, independent, and prestigious individuals who do not hesitate
83. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33 (1990).
84. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (prison); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (mental hospital).
85. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996);
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
86. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PRocEss: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 22-95
(5th ed. 1986); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYsTmi 87-124 (1981); JOHN PAUL RYAN Er AL., AMERICAN TRIAL
JUDGES: THEIR VORK STYLS AND PERFoRmANCE 121-45 (19S0); JOHN R_
SCwM1IDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JusTicEs: THE FEDERAL APPELATE JUDICIARY 41-
104 (1979).
87. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. Also, to assure further the independence of federal
judges, that same article provides that "they shall ... receive for their Services, a
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to confront other branches of the federal government or the states.
The federal judiciary does not in any way resemble a bureaucracy.
Furthermore, the federal judiciary has undertaken, as its own spe-
cial responsibility, to protect the constitutional rights of the people.
Federal judges consider the safeguarding of constitutional rights as
their most important responsibility. Federal judges have not been
timid in protecting these rights. They have developed vast bodies of
law based on vague and open-ended provisions of the Constitution
(like due process, equal protection, and freedom of speech) and
have fashioned the procedural and administrative means to imple-
ment their decisions.88
H. The legal profession and the Constitution
Any consideration of the role of the Constitution in American
legal and political life must also take into account the role played by
American lawyers,89 who constantly look to the Constitution to pro-
tect or assert the rights of their clients. In reality, it is often lawyers
who devise new constitutional theories and present them before the
courts. For example, after the Second World War, the leaders of the
civil rights movement turned to the courts to overturn the system of
legal segregation that existed in many southern states. In a series of
cases in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, civil rights lawyers
presented arguments based on the Constitution to the courts.90
Reacting favorably to those arguments, federal courts struck
down numerous state laws that had up to that time formed the legal
basis for racial segregation. Another example of successful constitu-
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."
Id.
88. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976). See CROZIER, supra note 43, for a French perspective lament-
ing "the delirium of due process" in America and commenting that government by
judges "leads to two disastrous consequences, the first of which [is] the creation of a
restricted caste with a monopoly over the decision-making process, [and] the second
[is] a profound transformation in the very nature of the public debate .... The
entire social system increasingly comes to revolve around ... static juridical debate,
which misses the essential point, namely, change and development." Id. at 116-17;
see also id. at 98-117.
The activism of the federal judiciary has given rise to considerable criticism in the
United States. For a thoughtful, well-reasoned, and moderate critique of judicial ac-
tivism, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THm LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (discussing the justification for
judicial review and advocating the "passive virtues" of judicial restraint).
89. For a description of American lawyers, see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS (1989).
90. See JONATHAN D. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1957-66 (1972); see also FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE
TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM (1995); JEFFERSON B. FORD-
HAM, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1957).
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tional advocacy is the successful effort of lawyers in the area of re-
productive rights.9 '
The legal profession is extremely prestigious in the United States.
The economic and social status of lawyers is high. Lawyers occupy
important positions in government at all levels and in the private
sector, as private practitioners and as officers of major corporations,
foundations, and universities. Highly intelligent and capable people
are attracted to the profession, and the leading national law schools
are recognized as occupying positions at the pinnacle of the educa-
tional system. When one considers the practical application of con-
stitutional principles, one must take into account the activism of the
bar-that body of capable, effective, creative, and aggressive law-
yers who never hesitate to rely on the Constitution in the courts to
protect and advance the interests of their clients.'
. Legal education in the United States
One final matter to highlight is the system of legal education in
the United States, which differs significantly from the French sys-
tem, for the activism and creativity of the American bench and bar
owes much to the training received by lawyers and judges. The lead-
ing American law schools are prestigious and attract bright and am-
bitious students. Entry is extremely competitive. Methods of
instruction are practical and result-oriented, focusing on analysis
and problem-solving undertaken in the context of particular cases
and transactions. Moreover, the Socratic method, where students
must respond in class, even in large classes, to questions and follow-
up questions from the instructor, aims at producing lawyers who are
self-confident, can think on their feet, and can present and defend
their views in challenging and stressful public settings. Lecturing by
professors, with students passively taking notes, is regarded as a
poor way to utilize class time. In addition, mandatory moot court
programs, as well as upper-class trial practice courses, clinical prac-
tice programs, externships, interscholastic moot court competitions,
and law review membership require students to think for them-
selves, to utilize the research skills that they have acquired, and to
act independently.
Lawyers trained in the American system tend to view law as a
tool to accomplish desired ends, rather than as a static body of prin-
ciples and rules. Lawyers, as law students, have been taught to work
with the legal materials at their disposal in innovative ways to create
91. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
92. The adjudicative process in the United States has been aptly described as a




new legal doctrines and theories to advance the causes of their
clients.
III. THE CONSTITUTION IN FRANCE
A. French constitutional thought
Although it is traditional to regard 987, the year in which Hugh
Capet ascended to the throne of France, as the commencement of
the French monarchy, it is more useful to begin our discussion of the
French constitutional tradition about the year 1500, with the begin-
ning of the consolidation of the French nation-state as we know it
today.9' At the beginning of the sixteenth century, French constitu-
tional thought, reflecting the weakness of the monarchy and the cor-
responding power of the Church and nobility, embraced "the
medieval conception of the social organism as composed of a great
complex of individuals of varying rights, status, and consequent po-
sition in the hierarchical structure."94 The work which best ex-
presses this corporate or feudal view of the state is La Grande
Monarchie de France by Claude de Seyssel, first published in 1519. 9-
De Seyssel regarded the power of the hereditary monarch as "regu-
lated and bridled by good laws, ordinances, and customs established
in such a way that they can scarcely be broken or reduced to nothing
.... Of these bridles by which the absolute power of the king of
France is regulated I deem that there are three main ones. The first
is religion, the second justice, the third the polity."96 By polity de
Seyssel meant "the many ordinances, made by the kings of France
themselves and afterwards confirmed and approved from time to
93. Commencing in 1494 under Charles VIII (1483-1498), and continuing during
the reigns of Louis XII (1498-1515) and Franqois I (1515-1547), France embarked on
successive invasions of northern Italy, which collectively had the effect of bringing
France into close contact with the culture of Renaissance Italy. This period marks
the transition from the medieval period to the modem age in France. Louis XII, who
was king in 1500, is known in French history as the Father of His People. FREDEIC
J. BAUMGARTNER, Louis XII 149 (1994); see also 2 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE IDEN-
Trrv OF FRANCE: PEOPLE AND PRODUCTION 167-220 (Sign Reynolds, trans., William
Collins Sons 1990) (1986). Braudel demonstrates that on the basis of demographic
and economic factors-population, production, circulation of goods, price move-
ments-France since 1450 has been a "success story," id. at 167, and its experience
since then represents a marked departure from the "devastating hundred years be-
tween 1350 and 1450." Id.
94. WILLIAM FARR CHURCH, CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT IN SIXTEENTH-CEN-
TURY FRANCE 179 (Octagon Books 1969) (1941)..
95. CLAUDE DE SEYSSEL, THE MONARCHY OF FRANCE (Donald R. Kelley ed. &
J. H. Hexter trans., 1981) (1519). On de Seyssel, see Nannerl 0. Keohane, Claude
de Seyssel and Sixteenth-Century Constitutionalism in France, in CONSTITUTIONAL-
isM 47 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979); CHURCH, supra note 94,
at 22-42; J. W. ALLEN, A HISTORY OF POLmCAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CEN-
TURY 275-79 (1928).
96. DE SEYSSEL, supra note 95, at 51.
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time."'  The most important of these "many ordinances" are those
that pertain to the three estates of the people of France: "the realm
can scarcely fall into great decadence while they are well main-
tained, since each estate has its own rights and preeminences ac-
cording to its quality, and one estate can scarcely oppress the other,
nor all three together conspire against the head and monarch."' In
practical terms, de Seyssel regarded the royal prerogative as limited
by the Church, the Parlements, and an independent judiciary as
guardians of established legal usage. 9
The second half the sixteenth century was a time of great disorder
in France. This was the period of the wars of religion between the
Catholic majority and a substantial Huguenot (or French Protes-
tant) minority. The reestablishment of domestic order was the first
priority of the nation. In response to this need, constitutional theory
provided the rationale for strong central authority, at first stressing
the idea of sovereignty' and later, as the monarchy grew in power,
particularly during the reigns of Henry IV (1589-1610),o1 Louis
XIII (1610-1643),1°a and Louis XIV (1643-1715),1o the theory of the
divine right of kings.10 4
According to Jean Bodin, writing in 1576, sovereignty is "the dis-
tinguishing mark of a commonwealth."10  Sovereignty is "absolute"
97. I& at 56.
98. Id. at 58. De Seyssel does not include the church among the three estates.
For him, they are "the nobility, the middle people which might be called the rich
people, and the lesser folk." Id.
99. Id. at 22-42. According to a fifteenth century writer, Jean de Terre Rouge,
"the king was administrator of an authority not his, an authority which devolved
upon him through law and which thus found its basis in established legal usage." Id.
at 29.
100. The principal work on sovereignty is JEAN BODIN, Six Boors OF TiE CONt.
MONWEALTH (M. J. Tooley trans., 1955), first published in 1576. See JEAN-JACQUES
CHEVALLIER, LES GRANDES OEUVRES POLrrIQUEs DE MACtIAVEL A NOS JOURS
38-51 (Libraire Armand Colin 6th ed. 1960) (1949).
101. See JAMES B. CoLLINs, THE STATE rN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 22-27
(1995). In 1598, Henry IV promulgated the Edict of Nantes, which guaranteed to
French Protestants limited freedom of worship and allowed them to have special
fortified towns. Id. at 103.
102. See IU at 28-60.
103. Louis XIV's attitudes toward the royal prerogative were significantly influ-
enced by a series of internal disorders and rebellious activity, known as the Fronde,
during the early years of his reign. See id. 65-78. Perhaps the event most symbolic
of the centralizing and absolutist tendencies of the reign of Louis XIV was his repeal
in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes by the Edict of Fontainebleau, which outlawed the
Protestant religion in most of France. Id. at 103-05.
104. The principal theoretical work justifying the divine right of kings is JAC-
QUEs-BENIGNE BossuET, PoLrcs DRAWN FROM THE VERY WORDS OF HOLY
ScRiinuRE (Patrick Riley ed. & trans. Cambridge Univ. Press n.d.) (1709). For a
discussion of this important work by Bishop Bossuet, largely completed by 1679 and
published in 1709, see CrmvALuER, supra note 100, at 70-84.
105. BODiN, supra note 100, at 25.
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and "perpetual;, 10 6 "the principal mark of sovereign majesty and
absolute power is the right to im ose laws generally on all subjects
regardless of their consent .... ."lO Furthermore, "the sovereignty
of the king is in no wise qualified or diminished by the existence of
Estates."' 08
Whereas Bodin accepts the possibility that sovereignty can reside
in different persons or bodies (a single prince, all the people, or a
minority, corresponding respectively to monarchy, a popular state,
or aristocracy), the divine right of kings theory, building on the con-
cept of sovereignty elaborated by Bodin, locates sovereign power in
the hereditary monarch. Royal power flows directly from God; the
royal prerogative is absolute; it is subject to no "bridles" or limita-
tions.1 9 According to Bishop Bossuet, monarchy is the most com-
mon, the most ancient, the most natural, and the best form of
government," 0  and hereditary monarchy has particular
advantages."'
With the clear triumph of the monarchy over particularist internal
forces that threatened the existence of the nation as such, the polit-
ical need for royal absolutism diminished. It was in this climate that
the work of Montesquieu found fertile soil. Reacting against the
absolutist tradition and looking to the English system as a model," 2
Montesquieu, in his De l'Esprit des Lois, first published in 1748, de-
veloped a political analysis that focused on the idea of "constitu-
tion" as "the indispensable term to describe the fundamental order
of a state, the models of political existence of a nation or people, the
essential disposition of the elements or powers composing a form of
government.""11 3 In so doing, he "gave the term 'constitution' a new
centrality in eighteenth-century political understanding,"'" 4 and de-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id. "Those who have written books about the duties of magistrates and such
like matters are in error in maintaining that the authority of the Estates is superior
to that of the prince. Such doctrines serve only to encourage subjects to resist their
sovereign rulers." Id. at 31 (footnote omitted). Moreover, "[c]ustom only has bind-
ing force by the sufferance and during the good pleasure of the sovereign prince, and
so far as he is willing to authorize it." Id. at 44.
109. See BOSSUET, supra note 104, passim.
110. Id at 46-48.
111. Id. at 49-51.
112. See 1 MOrNrEsotUIEu, DE L'EsPIRrr DES Lois, 161-95 (Gonzague Truc ed.,
Gamier Fr~res n.d.) (1748).
113. Keith M. Baker, Constitution, in A CRMCAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTNON, supra note 4, at 479, 481.
114. Id.
Montesquieu in effect wrote out the English constitution, and Blackstone
in copying it gave that version a semi-official standing ....
Montesquieu not only moved from medieval to modem constitutional-
ism; he also turned the classical notion of the mixed constitution into the
more adaptable theory of the separation of powers.
[Vol. 49:21
CONSTITUTIONALISM
scribed the conditions necessary for the limitation of power for the
protection of political liberty.1n 5 More specifically, in De l'Esprit des
Lois Montesquieu advocates a constitution based on the principle of
separation of powers.'16 To assure liberty, he maintains, legislative,
executive, and judicial powers must be kept separate. The judicial
power, however, is subordinate to the legislative power, as the sole
function of the judge is to apply the law, for "the judges of the na-
tion are ... nothing but the mouth which pronounces the words of
the law; they are inanimate beings who cannot moderate either the
force or rigour of the law." '"7 In fact, he says, "Of the three powers
of which we have spoken, the judicial is, in a sense, null. ' 18
When the Estates-General met in May 1789, one of the principal
demands expressed in the cahiers de dolances was for the formal,
written, reaffirmation of traditional French constitutional princi-
ples." 9 While Montesquieu's introduction of the idea of a written
constitution into the intellectual mix of the times would prove im-
portant during the early years of the Revolution, revolutionary
political thought would change his emphasis from that of giving ex-
pression to an existing "constitutional" order to that of viewing the
constitution as an original act of establishing a new "constitutional"
order.' 20 Moreover, this new constitution was to be based on first
principles, rather than on existing institutions and practices. Revolu-
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MONTESQumu 112 (1987).
115. 1 MONTESQUImU, supra note 112, at 161-95.
116. Article XVI of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of
1789 did in fact equate constitutional government with separation of powers and the
protection of individual rights. "Every society in which the guaranty of rights is not
assured or the separation of powers established, has no Constitution." Declaration
des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789, reprinted in S'mnHANE RIALs, LA
DtCLARATION DES Dxorrs DE L'HoMME ET DU CrroYEN 26 (1988).
117. 1 MoNTFsumu, supra note 112 at 163-74. For a discussion of Montes-
quieu's views of separation of powers, the judicial power, and law, see MAURO CAP.
PELL=TT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECnVE 190-98 (1989).
118. MoNTESOUImu, supra note 112 at 163-74.
119. On the cahiers, see infra note 145. On the decision to convene the Estates-
General, see JEAN EGRET, THE FRENCI PREREVOLUtMN 1787-1788, at 179-214
OVesley D. Camp trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1977) (1962); on the election of the
Estates-General, see Wn.LtAi DOYLE, ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 139-
57 (1980); on the role of the Estates-General in the early months of the Revolution,
see id at 168-77.
120. See Baker, supra note 113, at 483.
The idea that France possesses a traditional form of government providing
at least the elements of a constitution-whose principles could now be re-
affirmed, perfected, and fixed in a written document-was finally rejected
in favor of a conception of the constitution as created anew by an act of
sovereign national will and instituted in accordance with abstract principles
of political right.
Id. at 485; see also Marina Valensise, La constitution franpaise, in 1 THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN PoLrrCAL CULTURE THE PoLrr.
ICAL CULTURE OF THE OLD REGINE 441, 444 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1987).
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tionary politicians were faced not only with the problem of estab-
lishing a new, legitimate political order, they also had to
delegitimize the existing order which was to be replaced. Building
on organic foundations therefore would not do. 2 '
The work that best expressed the political and social aspirations
of the French at the time of the Revolution and whose ideas still
resonate powerfully in France today is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du
Contrat Social, published in 1762. In spite of its ultimate impracti-
cality and ambiguity, Rousseau's work epitomizes the different,
often contradictory, strands of French thought regarding the organi-
zation of public life, and expresses certain visceral understandings of
the French people regarding the political organization of society and
law. Rousseau's conceptions of the "social contract," of "law," and
of "republican virtue" are particularly important.
For Rousseau, the social order is founded on a social compact:
"Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each
member as an indivisible part of the whole."" The formation of
civil society by agreement does not result in loss of freedom for the
individual; in fact, just the opposite. "[S]ince there is no associate
over whom [the individual] does not acquire the same right that he
would grant others over himself, he gains the equivalent of every-
thing he loses, along with a greater amount of force to preserve what
he has."'" "The social order is a sacred right which serves as the
foundation of all other rights,"' 24 since "[the] passage from the state
of nature to the civil state produces a remarkable change in man, for
it substitutes justice for instinct in his behavior and gives his actions
a moral quality they previously lacked.' 125
According to Rousseau, the social contract, or "act of association,
includes a reciprocal commitment between the public and private
121. See Marcel Gauchet, Rights of Man, in A CITICAL DIcrIONARY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 818, 822-23; see also Valensise, supra note
120, who offers the following perceptive observation:
Absolutism, by abolishing the political space between governmental power
and the individual, .. . brought into being conditions favorable to the crea-
tion of a society of subjects equal in their rights and in their submission and
obedience to the sovereign power. Such a society would become the indis-
pensable precondition to a simple and uniform representation, conforming
to reason, which the Revolution would translate into the universal and gen-
eral idea of the nation.
lL at 457.
122. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACr 24 (Donald A. Cress
ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1762) (emphasis in original).
123. 1L
124. ld. at 17.
125. Id. at 26. Rousseau continues: "What man loses through the social contract
is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he
can acquire. What he gains is civil liberty and the proprietary right of all he pos-
sesses." Id. at 27.
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individuals, and that each individual, contracting as it were, with
himself finds himself under a twofold commitment: namely as a
member of the sovereign to private individuals, and as a member of
the state toward the sovereign."'" Since individuals are in effect
contracting with themselves, "it is apparent," says Rousseau, "that
there neither is nor can be any type of fundamental law that is obli-
gatory for the people as a body, not even the social contract. ' 127
Moreover, it is contrary to the very nature of sovereignty "for the
will to tie its hands for the future."'128 "If, therefore, the populace
promises simply to obey, it dissolves itself by this act, it loses its
standing as a people. The very moment there is a master, there no
longer is a sovereign, and thenceforward the body politic is de-
stroyed."' 29 Thus, in Rousseau's famous formulation, "sovereignty
is inalienable."'' °
These rather abstract ideas spring from and express deep feelings
about the true nature of politics and society. Conventional political
thinking by the end of the seventeenth century had embraced the
doctrine of the divine right of kings. According to this theory, "roy-
alty has its origin in Divinity itself .... [God] chose a monarchial
and hereditary state, as the most natural and the most durable
. . . ."31 Rousseau turned this idea on its head. Rather than the
monarch being sovereign and the people subject to his will, Rous-
seau proclaimed the sovereignty of the people-a sovereignty that
could not be lost by conquest' 32 or even relinquished voluntarily.133
Or, in the words of Jean-Jacques Chevallier. "Sovereignty of the
people, that is to say of the citizens as a body .... substituted for the
concrete sovereignty of a Louis XV usurped from that of God! A
sovereignty which opposes l'tat c'est moi of the absolute monarch
with l'PEtat c'est nous of the people as a body." 1"
Rousseau's ideas continue to express the feelings of the French
toward their fundamental law-which since 1791 has been embod-
126. Id. at 25.
127. ld.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 29.
131. BossuET, supra note 104, at 54.
132. See RoussEAu, supra note 122, at 19-20.
133. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
134. CHEVALLmR, supra note 100, at 153; see also Bernard Manin, Rousseau. in
A CRITICAL DICIONARY OF THE FRENCH REvOLuTIoN. supra note 4, at 818.
By insisting more than any other theorist on the idea that the people is one
(or can be made one), and by defining it as a subject with a will of its own,
Rousseau beyond any doubt laid the intellectual groundwork for the
Revolution and prepared people to accept its single most characteristic act:
that of installing those who expressed the will of the people in the place




ied in a succession of written constitutions. The fundamental law
must be malleable; it must express the current will of the people.
Not to alter it as political and social views change would be contrary
to the very nature of the social contract. For it to be altered by acts
of the government or by court decisions would also be contrary to
the "inalienable" nature of the sovereignty of the people.135
Furthermore, not only is the general will unitary and inalienable,
it is also infallible and fundamentally just. This is so because the
people is either virtuous or has the capacity to become so, or more
generally, in the words of Bernard Manin, that "the people is good
and worthy of love.' 136 Rousseau expressed and expounded this
point of view in mile, his work on education, and in his novel La
Nouvelle Hdlose. For Rousseau, politics and ethics are inseparable.
In his Confessions, Rousseau writes:
[E]verything ultimately depends on politics, . . . a people
could only ever be what the nature of its government would
allow it to be; thus, the great question of the best possible gov-
ernment appeared to me to reduce itself to this: What is the
type of government most likely to develop the most virtuous,
the most enlightened, the wisest, the best people .... 137
As a consequence, more than simply locate the general will in a uni-
tary people, Rousseau argued for the fundamental rightness and de-
sirability of this result based on his view of the goodness and
perfectibility of man. "Most crucially," as Bernard Manin points
135. See Baker, supra note 113, at 479 ("Unlike the American Revolution, which
effectively translated the assertion of revolutionary will into the establishment of a
stable constitutional order, the French Revolution opened a widening gap between
revolution and constitution, effectively resisting successive efforts to bring the revo-
lutionary movement to its constitutional completion."). Professor Baker also makes
the following telling observation:
A first implication of [the] constitutional choices of mid-September 1789
was that the Assembly opted for the radical, Rousseauian definition of the
constitution as a formal organization of the organs and functions of govern-
ment created de novo by an act of sovereign will....
But if a constitution could be created anew in accordance with the princi-
ple of national sovereignty, could it not also be abolished and replaced on
the same basis? And if popular action could force the acceptance of consti-
tutional principles in the name of the nation, could it not also force their
revision or repudiation once accepted? ... Having unleashed the principle
of national sovereignty, the National Assembly now faced the difficulties of
containing it.
Id. at 490-91.
136. Manin, supra note 134, at 840; see also Mona Ozouf, Regeneration, in A
CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 781; Mona
Ozouf, La rdvolution fran~aise el l'idde de l'homme nouveau, in 2 THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLITICAL CULTURE: THE POLIT-
ICAL CULTURE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 213 (Colin Lucas ed., 1988); ERNST
CASSIRER, Kant and Rousseau, in ROUSSEAU, KANT AND GOETHE 1 (1945).
137. JEAN-JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, LES CONFESSIONS 480 (Jacques Voisine, ed.,
Gamier Frdres 1964) (n.d.).
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out, "Rousseau embodied these ideas in immediate, accessible
* "138images.
An understanding of Rousseau's conception of "law" is also nec-
essary to understand and appreciate the French legal system. Ac-
cording to Rousseau, law (or legislation) is the expression of the
general will. It is the law that makes the general will operational.1 39
As an expression of the general will, law is enacted by the entire
populace for the entire populace. A law then must be general, apply
equally to all members of the body politic, and have an object that is
general. "When I say that the object of the laws is always general, I
have in mind that the law considers subjects as a body and actions in
the abstract, never a man as an individual or a particular action." 4 '
That this abstract formulation is aimed at specific grievances against
the ancien regime (like the privileges enjoyed by the nobility, the
despotic rule of the hereditary monarch, etc.) is made clear by what
follows in Rousseau's text:
Thus the law can perfectly well enact a statute to the effect
that there be privileges, but it cannot bestow them by name on
anyone. The law can create several classes of citizens, and
even stipulate the qualifications that determine membership in
these classes, but it cannot name specific persons to be admit-
ted to them. It can establish a royal government and a heredi-
tary line of succession, but it cannot elect a king or name a
royal family. In a word, any function that relates to an individ-
138. Manin, supra note 134, at 841.
139.
Throu h the social compact we have given existence and life to the body
politic. It is now a matter of giving it movement and will through legisla-
tion.... There must therefore be... laws to unite rights and duties and to
refer justice back to its object. In the state of nature where everything is
commonly held, I owe nothing to those to whom I have promised nothing.
I recognize as belonging to someone else only what is not useful to me. It
is not this way in the civil state where all rights are fixed by law.
RoussEAu, supra note 122, at 36-37.
140. ld. at 37. See also GR~m.., supra note 9, at 661-65:
[The] work [of the legislator] reveals, more than it creates. His law pro-
claims rules and truths which, arise necessarily in the reason of all sensible
men when they consider their own natures and the exigencies of their coex-
istence and take on an "immanente" and "immarcesible" quality .... [T]o
be obliged to obey the law... means to cease being subject to human will,
always suspected of caprice or mediocrity, whether it be that of monarchs,
administrators, or judges. The ... law... is a reflection of justice, objectiv-
ity, and permanence ....
It is this conjunction of unchallenged supremacy and timeless transcen-
dence that has led historians ... to speak of the law as sacred ["la sacralisa.
tion de la loP'], [implying] the submission of individuals and public
authorities less to the will of the legislator than to the intrinsically superior
rules ascertained by him and accepted as general and absolute, necessarily





ual does not belong to the legislative power. On this view, it is
immediately obvious that it is no longer necessary to ask who
is to make the laws, since they are acts of the general will; nor
whether the prince is above the laws, since he is a member of
the state; nor whether the law can be unjust, since no one is
unjust to himself; nor how one is both free and subject to the
laws, since they are merely the record of our own wills.141
But how is this "general" and "impersonal" law to be drafted and
enacted? "How can a blind multitude, which often does not know
what it wants, because it rarely knows what is good for it, undertake
by itself as great and as difficult a task as creating a system of legisla-
tion? ' 142 Rousseau's surprising answer is to appeal to a sort of deus
ex machina, an "extraordinary man," who possesses neither "magis-
tracy nor sovereignty," a modem-day Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, or
Calvin. 143 This disinterested individual would prepare legislation
for approval by the sovereign people.
For Rousseau, then, the law is sacrosanct. As an expression of the
general will it is "infallible"; it cannot err, it is "always right and
always tends toward the public utility."' 44 It follows then that the
law must be applied as written by judges and by administrative and
government officials; it may not be displaced by anyone but the sov-
ereign body politic itself. In effect, Rousseau's conceptions of the
law and the legislator describe almost exactly the Code civil and Na-
poleon, the "legislator" responsible for its preparation and
promulgation.
Rousseau's views powerfully informed political thinking during
the revolutionary period. The drive for a constitution approved by
the French people as a whole and the need for enlightened legisla-
tion in the interest of the entire nation figured importantly during
that tumultuous period of fundamental social and political change.
During the period leading up to the convening of the States-General
in 1789, there was considerable desire expressed by the people, as
evidenced in the cahiers de doldances,145 for the formal, written reaf-
firmation of traditional French constitutional principles before other
141. ROUSSEAU, supra note 122, at 37.
142. CHEVALLIER, supra note 100, at 155 (quoting Halbwachs).
143. ROUSSEAU, supra note 122, at 38-41.
144. Id. at 31.
145. On the cahiers de doldances, see HYSLOP, supra note 35, at 20-21:
Along with the development of the States-General in France grew the
practice of giving written instructions to the deputies. When the States-
General was summoned for 1789, the revival of this traditional procedure
led to the composition of cahiers de doldances in all the electoral districts of
France. Out of the total number of cahiers composed, six hundred fifteen
were designed as the specific instructions for the deputies direct to the
States-General. These may be called the general cahiers ....
d.; see also JEAN EGRET, THE FRENCH REVOLurION (Wesley D. Camp trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1977) (1962).
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business was undertaken.'l 6 As a preliminary matter, however,
fierce debate raged around the questions of how the States-General
should be organized and what its voting procedures ought to be.
Should the States-General be organized and vote by order? Or
should voting be by head? Should the Third Estate have a number
of representatives and votes equal to that of the other two orders?
In January 1789 an anonymous pamphlet dealing with these mat-
ters appeared which made claims for the supremacy of the Third
Estate and advanced arguments in their support which expressed in
forceful and moving terms the latent, but until then imprecisely for-
mulated, thoughts and feelings of the French people.'47 According
to this work, which was later attributed to a clergyman, the Abb
Sieybs, a constitution should be adopted not by the States-General,
but by a body composed of the Third Estate alone, what Siey~s
called a "National Assembly."
Sieybs work, Qu'est-ce que le iers Etat,11 provided a theoretical
and practical blueprint for the first stage of the Revolution, leading
up to the adoption of the Constitution of 1791. At the beginning of
his work, he posed the three questions which provided the organiz-
ing principle for that period: "1) What is the Third Estate? Every-
thing. 2) What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing.
3) What does it want to be? Something."149 After advancing empir-
ical arguments in support of each of these propositions in the first
part of his work, he devotes the final part to establishing a theoreti-
cal basis for the supremacy of Third Estate, in essence arguing that
the Third Estate is in fact la Nation and that it, and it alone, acting
through its representatives, should adopt, or "constitute," a constitu-
tion for the nation. Article 1[I of the Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789 will later proclaim this proposition:
"The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation.
146. HysLop, supra note 35, at 39-42.
147.
A forgotten biographer of Siey~s, A. Neton, writes that Le 7Ters was
born from the circumstances and was the synthesis of everything that was
seething "confusedly" in the minds and hearts of the people. Scattered and
without connection until then, all its simmering desires, passions, and ideas,
"thanks to Siey~s ... came together, united, and focused on one single
point."
CHEVALLIER, supra note 100, at 183; see also MURRAY FoRsYr, REASON AND
REVOLUTION: THE POLrnICAL THOUGHT OF THE AB13P SIEYts (1987); PAUL BAS-
TDF, SMIEV- ET SA PENStE (1939).
148. EMMANuEL SmYPs, Qu'EsT-CE oUE LE Timis ETAT? (Edme Champion ed.
1888) (n.d.).
149. ENAWANL JOSEPH StoYis, WHAT IS THE THImD ESTATE? 51-52 (S.E. Finer
ed. & M. Blondel trans., 1964).
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No body and no individual may exercise authority which does not
derive expressly therefrom." 150
In his final three chapters, Siey~s eschews history and tradition
and founds his arguments for the supremacy of the Third Estate on
logic and reason. Sainte-Beuve has called him the "Descartes de la
politique."'' But it is passion rather than reason that really ani-
mates the work of Siey~s and that made it such a compelling and
galvanizing force in French revolutionary politics. That emotional
power is directed against the privileges of the aristocracy, and it is
this critique that struck such a deep and responsive chord with the
French people. It is thus the existence and the abuse of privilege
which is really the gravamen of Siey~s's complaint and undergirds
his theoretical analysis. According to Siey~s:
Who is bold enough to maintain that the Third Estate does
not contain within itself everything needful to constitute a
complete nation? It is like a strong and robust man with one
arm still in chains. If the privileged order were removed, the
nation would not be something less but something more.
What then is the Third Estate? All; but an 'all' that is fettered
and oppressed. What would it be without the privileged or-
der? It would be all; but free and flourishing. Nothing will go
well without the Third Estate; everything would go considera-
bly better without the two others.1 2
Siey~s goes on to argue:
It is not enough to have shown that the privileged, far from
being useful to the nation, can only weaken and injure it; we
must prove further that the nobility is not part of our society
at all: it may be a burden for the nation, but it cannot be part
of it.
... Such a class, surely, is foreign to the nation because of its
idleness.'5 3
Siey~s's legacy to French constitutionalism was to decisively un-
dermine the sanctity of written constitutions. By applying the theo-
retical insights of Rousseau to the constitutional controversy before
the nation in early 1789, Siey~s drew on the practical implications of
Rousseau's theory and supplied it with compelling emotional
force.154 But, "in repudiating claims for a traditional constitution,
150. RIALS, supra note 116, at 22; see also La Constitution de 1791 [CONST. 1791]
tit. III, art. 1 (Fr.), in LES CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 38 (Jacques
Godechot ed., 1979).
151. CHEVALLIER, supra note 100, at 176; see also SiEYP.s, supra note 149, at 119-
39.
152. SIEY s, supra note 149, at 56-57; see also EMMANUEL SIYPy.s, Essai sur les
privileges, in SIEY-S, supra note 148, at 1.
153. SIEYtS, supra note 149, at 57 (footnote omitted).
154. On the relation between the thought of Rousseau and Sieys, see Bronislaw
Baczko, Le contrat social des Fran~ais: Sieyds et Rousseau, in 1 THE FRENCH
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Siey s had also undermined the capacity of any constitutional ar-
rangement to withstand the subversive effects of the principle of na-
tional sovereignty."'155
Views regarding the seat and exercise of national sovereignty and
the primacy of la loi find comprehensive and systematic expression
during the first part of the twentieth century in the writings of Ray-
mond Carr6 de Malberg.'56 In spite of strong countercurrents rep-
resented by the contemporaneous thought of the important legal
thinker Ion Duguit,'" the ideas of Carrd de Malberg eventually
prevailed as the conventional way of viewing the law and the state
and have been extremely influential up to the present day.158 While
Carr6 de Malberg takes issue with certain aspects of the theories of
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Siey~s, his conceptions of the nation
and the state strongly reinforce the notion of the malleability of the
constitution. His view of the law, however, while recognizing the
priority accorded to it since the Revolution, exposes certain theoret-
ical inconsistencies (what Georges Burdeau calls "intellectual
REVOLUTION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLTcAL CULTURE: TiE POLIT-
ICAL CULTURE OF THE OLD REGIME, supra note 120, at 493. See also Ran Haldvi,
La revolution constituant, les ambiguitus politiques, in 2 Tim FRENCH REVOLUrION
AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLITICAL CULTURE: THm PoLmcAL CULTURe
OF TiE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 136, at 69, 71 ("Rarely has a political
writer traced with as much perspicacity the possible scenarios of a constitutional
revolution. Rarely has a pamphlet given as much resonance to the passions of the
day.").
155. Keith M. Baker, Siey&s, in A CRMTICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCti
REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 313, 321. The Constitution of 1793 states explicitly:.
"A people always has the right to review, reform, and change its Constitution. One
generation cannot subject future generations to its laws." La Constitution de 1793
[CoNs-r. 1793] D&laration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen art. 28 (Fr.), in Lns
CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 82.
156. The principal works of Carr de Malberg are: 1 R. CARRA DE MALBERG,
CONTRIBUTION A LA THPORIE GI NtRALE DE L'TAT (1920); 2 R. CARRA DE
MALBERG, CONTRIBUTION A LA THI ORIE GtNtRALE DE L'-TAT (1922); and RAY.
MOND CARR8 DE MALBERG, LA LOI, EXPRESSION DE LA VOLONTA 0 ,NgRALE
(Economica 1984) (1931) [hereinafter LA Loi].
157. See Harold J. Laski, M. Duguit's Conception of the State, in MODERN THEO-
RiEs OF LAw 52 (V. Ivor Jennings ed., Wiley & Sons 1963) (1933). For a comparison
of the two competing legal philosophies that are exemplified by the work of Duguit
and Carr de Malberg, see STONE, supra note 10, at 23-45.
158.
After initial disfavor due to the influence of the concurrent thought of
... lon Duguit, the constitutional thought of Raymond Carrd de Malberg(1861-1935) encountered great success with an entire generation of legal
thinkers (Ren6 Capitant, Charles Eisenmann, Georges Burdeau, Paul Bas-
tid). It was even progressively transformed . .. into an incontestable
dogma and an indispensable reference.
Olivier Beaud, La souverainet6 dans la "Contribution d la thdorie gdn~rale de i'Egtat"
de Carre de Malberg, 1994 REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC 1251, 1252; see also Georges
Burdeau, Preface to LA Loi, supra note 156, at vii-ix.
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fraud")'59 underlying that doctrine that later would prove congenial
to the founders of the Fifth Republic.
The key to the legal thought of Carr6 de Malberg is his concep-
tion of national sovereignty. He analyzes the political function of
the principle of la souverainetd nationale (national sovereignty), ex-
pressed in Article 3 of the Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du
Citoyen of 1789 and in the Constitution of 1791, in order to give
content to this key phrase that appears in successive constitutions. 160
For Carr6 de Malberg, la souverainetd nationale has a far different
meaning from that which Rousseau attributed to the concept.
Whereas Rousseau regarded national sovereignty as possessed by
"the people" as individuals, Carr6 de Malberg regards national sov-
ereignty as possessed by la Nation as a collective. He calls Rous-
seau's theory "atomistic"'161 and rejects the Rousseauian equation of
la souverainetd nationale with direct democracy. According to Carrd
de Malberg, "what the French Revolution established by virtue of
the principle of national sovereignty is the representative regime, a
regime in which sovereignty, being reserved exclusively to the col-
lective and abstract entity of the nation, can only be exercised by a
person or body in the capacity of representative of the nation. 162
As for the constitution, however, it is still susceptible to modifica-
tion or replacement. "[A] direct consequence of the idea of national
sovereignty," maintains Carr6 de Malberg, "[is that] being the sole
sovereign, the nation reserves the right at any time to take back
power from those to whom it had entrusted it."' 63
According to Carr6 de Malberg, the notion of separation of pow-
ers does not imply the equality of powers or of the governmental
organs that exercise these powers. The political function of the doc-
trine of separation of powers is rather to assure to each organ of
government (i.e., legislature, executive, judiciary) independence in
its appropriate sphere, not to establish equality among them."f
Malberg credits Rousseau and Montesquieu for recognizing that
the Revolution extracted as one of the great principles of the
modem public law of France, the primacy and the supremacy
of the legislative power. Thus ... the Constituents of 1791
perceived no contradiction in establishing three equal and in-
dependent powers, on the one hand and in subordinating the
159. LA Loi, supra note 156, at ix.
160. The phrase souveraintg nationale appears in Article 3 of the present French
Constitution: "National sovereignty (1a souveraintM nationale) resides in the people,
who shall exercise it through their representatives and by means of referendum." La
Constitution [CoNsr.] art. 3 (Fr.).
161. 2 CARR8 DE MALBERG, supra note 156, at 155.
162. Id. at 196-97.
163. Id. at 191.
164. Id. at 48-58.
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executive and the judicial powers to the legislature on the
other.1
65
The primacy of the law, and therefore of parliament, however,
rests on a questionable theoretical base. According to the generally
accepted view of Rousseau, what gives the law its sanctity and pri-
macy is that it is the expression of the general will. For Carrd de
Malberg, however, this premise is not true, because the law is en-
acted by a parliamentary body which in fact does not express the
general will because the public is systematically excluded from the
legislative process. Alone of all the French constitutions, the Con-
stitution of 1793 established a mechanism for the vll of the nation
as a whole to be expressed in enacted law.11 Public participation
could also be accomplished by according to the people as a whole an
active role in the legislative process (for example by allowing the
people to initiate legislation or to disapprove legislative measures
enacted by the parliament). 167 Thus, to say that the law is the ex-
pression of the general will is simply a legal fiction."
Important consequences flow from this analysis. First, because a
law enacted by parliament is not the expression of the general will,
whereas the constitution is if it is brought into force by approval in a
popular referendum, parliamentary enactments, just like the acts
165. Id. at 49.
La !oi-in the constitutional sense of the term-is not in essence charac-
terized by its substance, but uniquely by its inherent authority, or its power,
either present or potential. The present power of the law consists in that in
every case the decision, general rule, or particular measure, mandated by
virtue of legislative authority, necessarily applies with a superior force not
only to subjects of the State, but even to all state authorities except the
legislator itself[;] in so far as these authorities are required... to execute
the law they can in no way impede its operation. The potential power of
the law consists in that the law can decide and command without the need
for support from a prior authorizing law;, in addition, it can derogate from
existing laws with respect to particular matters, as well as abrogating them
in general.
1 id. at 328.
166. The Constitution of 1793 establishes "Assembl~es primaires" in each canton
composed of all male citizens over the age of 21. La Constitution de 1793 [Co,,Sr.
1793] art. 11 (Fr.), in Ls co Ns-troN DE LA FRNCE DPULS 1789, supra note
150, at 84. The "AssembMes primaires" play an important role in the national legis-
lative process. La Constitution de 1793 [CONST. 1793] art. 59-60 (Fr.), in Las CoN.
SITUtIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPULs 1789, supra note 150, at 87.
167. LA Loi, supra note 156, at 217.
168. Id. at 216. Although Carrd de Malberg criticizes the notion that law enacted
by Parliament is in fact an expression of the general will, he still regards parliamen-
tary enactments, regardless of their content or generality, as supreme in the French
legal system. In an oft-quoted definition of the law, Carrd de Malberg says: "Law is
not characterized by its content, but rather by its form and by the force inherent in
this form. Law must be defined not by its particular subject matter but rather by its
inherent power (sa puissance sp&iale de d&sion initiale)." I CARTU1 DE MALBERo,
supra note 156, at 329.
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and decisions of the executive branch or the judiciary, are subject to
the constitution. Moreover, "Parliament, the Executive, and the ju-
diciary... are equal before the Constitution, which is the common
source of their powers."' 69 Thus, there is in principle "no obstacle
to the establishment of judicial review of laws."' 70
Even though the legal thought of Carr6 de Malberg for the most
part remained within the traditional view of law and the state, his
views of national sovereignty and the general will served to highlight
problems with traditional notions. In adcUtion, political activity in
France came increasingly to be seen as dominated by a closed and
self-perpetuating group, "la classe politique," which had less and less
claim to be the voice of the general will. Legislation became more
and more technical and specific, and thus clearly not the general and
timeless expression of natural reason of the Rousseauian tradition.
Consequently, the law as enacted by Parliament increasingly lost its
claim to superior status.171 The Constitution of 1958 would eventu-
ally give legal expression to these developments by limiting the "do-
main of the law"' 72 and by establishing a mechanism for the
constitutional review of legislation. 73
B. The Constitution as a "contested" document
Between 1791 and 1815 France had eight different constitu-
tions. 74 During these volatile times, as absolute monarchy gave
way to constitutional monarchy followed by radical republic, moder-
ate reaction, dictatorship, and finally the restoration of the monar-
chy, each successive dominant political group wrote its own
constitution for the nation. Subsequently, from 1815 to 1875, each
major political upheaval resulted in a new constitution (in 1830,
1848, 1852, 1870, and 1875). Successive constitutions differed signif-
icantly with respect to their treatment of governmental structure
169. LA Loi, supra note 156, at 220.
170. Id. at 221. See 8ric Maulin, Le Principe du contr6le de la constitutlonnalte
des lois dans la pens~e de Carrg de Malberg, 21 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROrr CON.
sTrrUTIONNEL 79 (1995).
171. See GRrDEL, supra note 9, at 663-65.
172. The demarcation of the domain of the law is accomplished by the enumera-
tion of those matters which are to be dealt with by laws (lois) in Article 34 and
Article 37, which states that "matters other than those which are within the domain
of law have an executive character (caractere rdglementaire)." La Constitution
[CONST.] art. 37 (Fr.), in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., FRENCH LAW ch. 2, at 9
(1994).
173. See Articles 56-63 of the Constitution of 1958, which establish and define the
competence of the Conseil Constitutionnel; see also infra notes 227-33, and accompa-
nying text.
174. See MARCEL PRPLOT & JEAN BOULOUIS, INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET
Dgorr CONSTrruTIONNEL 305-06 (11th ed. 1990) for a listing of France's 16 constitu-
tions. See LEs CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150 for the
complete texts of French constitutions since 1789 and for a discussion of each.
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and fundamental values.'7 5 Rather than constitutional continuity,
then, the French constitutional experience in its formative years
could perhaps best be described as a succession of constitutions that
represented the governmental ideas and social and civic values of
the faction that controlled national political power at a given time.
Since 1875, it is true, a certain constitutional stability has prevailed
in France: the Constitution of the Third Republic, adopted in 1875,
endured for sixty-five years, until 1940; after the short-lived Fourth
Republic (1946-1958), France has lived under the Constitution of
the Fifth Republic since 1958, for nearly forty years. 76
The "contested" nature of the French constitution is not only a
revolutionary and nineteenth century phenomenon, it is also exem-
plified by post-war constitutional developments. By the referendum
of October 21, 1945, French voters decided not to reinstate the Con-
stitution of 1875, but rather to convene a Constituent Assembly to
draft a new constitution."7 The Assembly, dominated by a socialist-
communist majority, produced a draft constitution which accorded
complete supremacy to the legislature. 7 1 Thus, the single-chamber
175. For brief descriptions of all French constitutions since 1791, see LEs CONSTI.
TUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150. Professor Dicey offers the
following interesting observation on constitution making in France:
The errors committed by French constitutionalists have been... twofold.
Frenchmen have always been blind to the fact that a constitution may be
undermined by the passing of laws which, without nominally changing its
provisions, violate its principles. They have therefore failed to provide any
adequate means, such as those adopted by the founders of the United
States, for rendering unconstitutional legislation inoperative. They have in
the next place, generally, though not invariably, underrated the dangers of
convoking a constituent assembly, which, as its meeting suspends the au-
thority of the established legislature and Executive, is likely to become a
revolutionary convention.
A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCHON TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OFTHE CoNsTrLT-ON 475
(8th ed. 1931).
176. Between 1789 and 1959, in addition to 16 constitutions, France had 21
"semi-constitutional governments" and "de facto regimes," some lasting for periods
as long as two or three years. See PnLoT & BouLouls, supra note 174, at 306-0S.
The volatility in French political life between 1789 and 1870 can be attributed to the
continuing revolutionary tradition and to the reaction it provoked. See generally
FURET, supra note 7.
177. The traditional French procedure for drafting a constitution based on repub-
lican principles was the convening of an Assemblee constituante. Tension ran high,
however, because of the contemporary "climate of deep division," and the historical
association of republican government with "the blood of the Terror, the June Days,
and the Commune." PRmLOT & BouLouis, supra note 174, at 544. For a good de-
scription of the various political forces which emerged from the war, see Stanley
Hoffmann, Paradoxes of the French Political Community, in STANLEY HoMrANN Ear
At., IN SEARCH OF FRANcE 34-60 (1963).
178. In addition to naming the president and the prime minister, the legislature
would have control over the composition, structure, and program of the executive
branch of government, and over the operations of the judiciary. PRfLoT &
Boui.ouis, supra note 174, at 550-52. The text of the draft constitution of April 19,
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National Assembly was accorded the power to elect the president,
the prime minister, and all other ministers, to make laws and adopt
the budget, and in effect to manage the government. This draft was
approved in the Assembly by a vote of 309 to 249. In the referen-
dum of May 5, 1946, the draft constitution was rejected by the peo-
ple by a vote of 10,584,359 non to 9,454,034 oui.179 The draft
constitution was most likely defeated due to popular aversion to a
"regime d'Assemblde," which was perceived as being closely associ-
ated with the Communist party or at least susceptible of being used
by the Communists to seize power.' 80 A new Constituent Assembly
was elected to prepare a new Constitution. Although the parties of
the left were still in the majority, centrist forces had improved their
position. The result was a draft that accorded more power to the
president, but still adhered to the basic principles of parliamentary
supremacy. The Assembly approved this second draft by a vote of
440 to 106. Just several hours later, however, in a speech delivered
at tpinal, General de Gaulle declared himself categorically hostile
to the text which had just been adopted ("Non, franchement
non.").18  Nevertheless, in the ensuing referendum the draft was
approved by the people (9,297,000 oui, 8,165,000 non)."8 There
were, however, about 1,000,000 blank ballots cast; and about
6,000,000 eligible voters did not cast ballots. The Constitution was
thus approved by only thirty-six percent of the electorate.183
By the mid-1950s France was once again in the midst of political
crisis. The dominant role accorded to parliament by the 1946 Con-
stitution continued to produce short-lived coalition governments
that proved incapable of dealing with the pressing problems of the
period, particularly those occasioned by post-war decolonization.
Although constitutional revision had been under discussion since
1954 and some minor amendments had been made in that year,
there was no progress on important matters. By the spring of 1958,
1946, appears in Las CONSTIrtrTONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at
371-88.
179. Marcel Prdlot and Jean Boulouis describe these results as "without prece-
dent in our constitutional history, in which all the Constitutions submitted to the
electorate had been until then approved by substantial, and often overwhelming,
majorities." PRtLOT & BOULOUIS, supra note 174, at 553. See also Las CONsTrru-
TIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 361-62.
180. LEs CONSTITUTONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 362.
181. PRaLOT & BouLouis, supra note 174, at 556. In an important speech deliv-
ered at Bayeux on June 16, 1946, General de Gaulle had previously expressed his
preference for a strong president on the American model (that would, for example,
allow the president to appoint the prime minister) as well as for a second legislative
chamber. Las CON TrrrTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 362-
63. Excerpts from General de Gaulle's speech at tpinal are reproduced in PR9LOT
& BOULOUIS, supra note 174, at 611-12.
182. PR"LoT & BouLouis, supra note 174, at 556.
183. LEs CONs~rrnONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 363.
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extreme dissatisfaction with the government, particularly on the
right and among the military, made a coup d'etat or even civil con-
ffict a distinct possibility. In May, after the resignation of Prime
Minister Pierre Pfinlin, President Ren6 Coty invited General de
Gaulle to form a government. General de Gaulle accepted the invi-
tation. On June 1, the National Assembly accorded a vote of confi-
dence (329-224) to the de Gaulle government and on June 3 the
Assembly, at the behest of the new government, enacted a law au-
thorizing the revision of the Constitution."s The new Constitution
was submitted to referendum on September 28 and was overwhelm-
ingly approved by the people by a vote of 31,066,502 oui to
5,419,749 non. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was promul-
gated on October 4, 1958.11
From these brief descriptions of the politics of constitution mak-
ing in 1946 and 1958, one can readily observe the intensely political
nature of the process. There are winners and losers. Voting in the
constitutive bodies was along party (and ideological) lines, as was
voting in the national referenda. Since constitution making is not
regarded as a one-time enterprise, the losers can look forward to
other chances in the future. Why, then, give one's allegiance to the
particular constitution that has been adopted? After all, it repre-
sents the triumph of the political opposition.
There are certain original aspects of the Constitution of 1958 that
should be noted. First, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic estab-
lishes a strong president. Although the original Constitution, as
promulgated in 1958, provided for the indirect election of the presi-
dent, a 1962 amendment provided for the direct election of the pres-
ident by universal suffrage. Second, the Constitution clearly
demarcates and limits the domain of the law and accords significant
184. The Constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, J.O., June 4, 1958, provided:
The Government of the Republic shall prepare the draft of a constitu-
tional law implementing the following principles:
1. Universal suffrage shall be the sole source of power. Legislative
power and executive power shall emanate from universal suffrage or from
bodies elected thereby,
2. The executive power and the legislative power must be separated ef-
fectively in such a manner that the Government and the Parliament shall
each, for itself and on its own responsibility, exercise fully the powers at-
tributed to it;
3. The Government must be responsible to Parliament;
4. The judicial authority must remain independent in order that it shall
be capable of assuring respect for the essential liberties defined by the Pre-
amble to the Constitution of 1946 and by the Declaration of the Rights of
Man to which it refers;
5. The Constitution must permit organization of the relations of the Re-
public with the peoples associated with it.
Constitutional Law of June 3, 1958, J.O. June 4, 1958, in BaniANN ET AL., supra
note 172, at 8 n.2.
185. PRt~a- & BouLotns, supra note 174, at 607.
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rule-making power to the executive. Third, the Constitution estab-
lishes a mechanism for assuring that Parliament does not overstep
its assigned domain at the expense of the executive by creating a
Constitutional Counsel whose principal role is to enforce the alloca-
tion of competence between the executive and legislative branches.
Taken together, these innovations in the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic represent a marked departure from the Rousseauian tradi-
tion of parliamentary domination of both the political and legal
systems.
It is also significant, however, that the Constitution does not es-
tablish a Bonapartist-type government. In fact, the Constitution of
1958 represents something of a novelty in France: it establishes a
"mixed" form of government, one which combines aspects of a par-
liamentary system with a strong president. In so doing, the form of
government instituted by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic may
very well allow the government to function effectively while at the
same time providing adequate representation for the diverse views
of the French people.'8 6
C. The Constitution and fundamental values
One seeking an expression of the fundamental political and social
values in France would not look to the Constitution or to the juris-
prudence interpreting the Constitution. On a legal level, it is rather
to the Code civil, as it has been amended and interpreted, or to la
jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat, that one would refer, 187 although
this may be changing with the increasing role of the Conseil constitu-
tionnel in articulating and applying the Constitution and other texts
that have une valeur constitutionnelle.8' Of more importance, how-
ever, the fundamental values of French society do not find their
principal expression in legal texts at all; it is rather literary, philo-
sophical, and political works that express the principal social and
political ideals and aspirations of the French people.
Tocqueville gives the following explanation for the position of lit-
erary, philosophical, and political texts as the principal expressions
of fundamental values in France, a phenomenon that he sees as dat-
ing from the mid-eighteenth century:
[B]y abolishing the ancient "liberties" and destroying the
political function of the nobility without also permitting the
formation of a new ruling class on a different basis, the monar-
chy unwittingly set up the writers as imaginary substitutes for
186. From 1791 to 1958, French systems of government oscillated from broadly
representational, but ineffective, to authoritarian.
187. CLAUDE-ALBERT COLLIARD, LIBERTAS PUBLIQUES 210-11 (7th ed. 1989).
188. See, eg., Louis Favoreu, The Principle of Equality in the Jurisprudence of the
Conseil Constitutionnel, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 165 (1992).
[Vol. 49:21
CONSTITUTIONALISM
that ruling class. Hence literature took on a political
function[.] 89
Frangois Furet describes certain important consequences which at-
tend the primacy of literary texts as repositories of political and so-
cial values. Thus,
That confusion of r6les, in which men of letters assumed a
function they could fulfill only in its imaginary aspects, that is,
as opinion-makers who wielded no practical power whatso-
ever, was to shape political culture itself. The men of letters
tended to substitute abstract right for the consideration of
facts, principles for the weighing of means, values and goals
for power and action. Thus the French, deprived as they were
of true liberties, strove for abstract liberty; incapable of collec-
tive experience, lacking the means of testing the limits of ac-
tion, they unwittingly moved toward the illusion of politics.
Since there was no debate on how best to govern people and
things, France came to discuss goals and values as the only
content and the only foundation of public life.190
Any American familiar with public political and social discourse
in France will at once recognize the perspicacity of Furet's descrip-
tion. In contrast to public debate in America on these subjects,
which is to a great extent focused on the practical and operational
aspects of public policy, French debate appears highly theoretical
and removed from the actual workings of the political process. 191
I would like to discuss the principle of equality, as it has devel-
oped in France, as an example of the differing roots of fundamental
values in France and the United States.
According to Frangois Furet, "[t]he central tenet of [the Revolu-
tionary] credo was the idea of equality, experienced as the reverse
of the old society and perceived as the condition and purpose of the
new social compact."' 2 Rousseau's Du Contract Social is the locus
classicus of the French notion of equality. In that work, Rousseau
describes a society of equals and provides a comprehensive and con-
vincing rationale for it. He defines the principal political relation-
189. FRaNAois FuREr, INTERPRETMNG THE FRNncH REVOLuTMON 36 (Elborg
Forster, trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1981). Tocqueville developed these ideas in
chapter 1 of Part 3 of his Ti OLD Rolmhm AND THE FRENCn RE voLuo N (Stuart
Gilbert, trans., 1955) (1856), at 138-48.
190. FuREr, supra note 189, at 37.
191. Consider in this light Georges Sorel's famous book MLinoNs SUR LA ViO-
LENCE (1908), in which he advocates the "myth of the general strike" (not the real-
ity) as the organizing principle for revolutionary syndicalism in its battle against the
bourgeoisie. For a discussion of Sorel's Rr.ExiONS, see CnvAuani , supra note
100, at 313-32.
192. FuREr, supra note 189, at 53; see also COLL.ARD, supra note 187, at 205
("Equality (6galit6) is the governing principle (l'idde maftresse) of the Revolution of
1789 .... The civic equality of the Constituante is a revolutionary affirmation of
opposition to the privileges of the past.").
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ships and institutions of such a society in a way that is coherent (for
the most part) and which made and to a large extent continues to
make intuitive sense to the French people.' 93 For Rousseau, the so-
cial compact, by which civil society is constituted,
instead of destroying natural equality..., on the contrary, sub-
stitutes a moral and legitimate equality to whatever physical
inequality nature may have... imposed upon men, and that,
however, unequal in force and intelligence they may be, men
all become equal by convention and by right.' 9 4
The principles, and in fact the very language, of the Ddclaration des
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, the one constitutional text that has
endured unchanged from the revolutionary period, attests to Rous-
seau's influence.
In the constitutional sphere, the idea of equality finds direct ex-
pression in Article I and Article VI of the Dgclaration des Droits de
I'Homme et du Citoyen of 1789,195 but, as Professor Colliard argues,
in a "singularly tentative" form.' 9 6 Thus, the principle of equality
does not appear in Article II, which enumerates the "natural and
imprescriptible rights of man" (which are said to be "liberty, prop-
erty, security and resistance to oppression"). The Constitutions of
1791 and 1793 clearly recognize the principle of equality as among
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man,"9 but subsequent
constitutions (e.g., those of 1852, 1875, 1946, and 1958) avoid such
clear statements of the principle, referring instead to "the great prin-
ciples proclaimed in 1789,"98 "the rights and liberties of man and
193. See supra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
194. RoussEAu, supra note 122, at 29.
195. "Men are born and remain free and equal in respect of their rights ..
RIALS, supra note 116, art. I, at 22. "The law is an expression of the general will....
It must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens being equal
in its sight are equally eligible to all honors, offices, and public employments, ac-
cording to their ability; and without distinction other than those of their virtues and
talents." I& art. VI, at 23.
196. COLLIARD, supra note 187, at 205. "[T]he striking thing about the eight-
eenth century's attempts to resolve the problem of inequality is their modera-
tion .... [T]he Constituent Assembly ... created legal equality, recoiled from
political equality, and never abandoned the principle of property." MONA OZOUF,
Equality, in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REvOLUION, supra note 4,
at 669, 673-77. Mona Ozouf points out the inherent tension between the dominant
ideas of the Revolution-equality, liberty, and property. Thus, a people may be
willing to endure the loss of liberty to ensure equality (as during the Napoleonic
period) or to tolerate inequality to protect property (as during the bourgeois-domi-
nated nineteenth century). Id. at 669-70.
197. La Constitution de 1791 [CONsT. 1791] Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et
du Ciroyen art. 1 (Fr.), in LEs CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra
note 150, at 33; La Constitution de 1793 [CoNsT. 1793] Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen art. 2 (Fr.), in LEs CONSTITTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS
1789, supra note 150, at 80.
198. La Constitution de 1852 [CONST. 1852] tit. 1, art. 1 (Fr.), in LEs CONSTITU-
TIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, supra note 150, at 292.
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the citizen consecrated in the declaration of rights of 1789,"' 9 or
"the Rights of man... as defined by the Declaration of 1789, con-
firmed and completed by the preamble of the Constitution of 1946"
and the guarantee of "the equality of all citizens before the law,
without regard to origin, race or religion." 2 0 The constitutional
foundation of the principle is, therefore, uncertain and ambiguous.
In the jurisprudence of the Conseil d' tat, however, the principle
has received detailed development and application as an unwritten
"general principle of law."2"1 For instance, in a decision of 1951, the
Conseil d' tat decided that the administration of the Radiodiffitsion
franfaise had violated the principle of equality in refusing to broad-
cast concerts of the Socidt des concerts du Conservatoire as a repri-
sal for a certain action taken by the Conservatoire which the
Radiodiffusion franfaise disapproved. 2° In its decision, the Conseil
d'Eftat referred to no text for the principle of equality or for its par-
ticular content as applied to the fact situation before the Conseil.
In 1973, the Conseil constitutionnel, for the first time, refused to
allow the promulgation of a legislative provision on the ground that
it "violates the principle of equality before the law contained in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and solemnly reaffirmed
by the Preamble to the Constitution."20' This decision marks the
beginning of the frequent application of the principle of equality by
the Conseil constitutionnel to legislative enactments. In its decisions
applying the principle of equality, the Conseil constitutionnel has
looked to the jurisprudence of the Conseil d' tat for guidance, but,
perhaps more importantly, has grounded its application of the prin-
ciple in the bloc de constitutionnalit6, and in this way has made the
Constitution of 1958, the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and
the Declaration of 1789 its authoritative reference points. The prin-
199. La Constitution de 1946 [CONST. 1946] preamble (Fr.), in LES coNsTrru.
3IONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUs 1789, supra note 150, at 371. The preamble to the
Constitution of 1946 also recognizes equality in several specific domains, for exam-
ple, the equal rights of men and women and equal access to education. Article 1 of
the draft Constitution of April 19, 1946, which was rejected in a national referen-
dum, clearly proclaimed the principle of equality: "All men are born and remain
free and equal before the law." Id. art. 1.
200. Constitution of 1958 [CONsT.] art. 2 (Fr.), in BEMIANN ET At-, supra note
172, ch. 2 at 9.
201. COLLIARD, supra note 187, at 221-27.
202. Soci td des concerts du Conservatoire, reprinted in M. LONG ET At., LEs
GRANDS ARYAM DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 444 (10th ed. 1993).
203. Decision of Dec. 27,1973 (Taxation d'Office), reprinted in Louis FAVOREU
& LoIc PHILIP, LES GRANDES D#CISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSITrIONNEL 275 (7th ed.
1993); see also Decision of Jan. 16, 1982 (Loi de nationalisation), reprinted in
FAVOREU & Pmnup, supra at 460. For a discussion of this decision, and the jurispru-
dence of the Conseil constitutionnel concerning the principle of equality, see
Favoreu, supra note 188. For a comparison of American and French views of legal
equality, see Vroom, supra note 38.
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ciple, which led the greater part of its legal and symbolic life outside
the constitutional domain, has now been brought within its confines.
D. The Constitution and national solidarity
As I have already discussed, in the United States the Constitution
is the primary symbol of national unity. In France, this is not at all
the case. As should already be apparent, the ephemeral, contested
French Constitution is ill-equipped for that role. In France, the na-
tion finds its symbolic expression elsewhere, principally in the idea
of la belle France or l'hexagone, the physical home of the French
people,2" in certain key historical events and personages, 205 and in
the idea of "civilization" and France's civilizing mission in the
world.20 6 On the political level, the French Revolution was un-
doubtedly the event which gave birth to modem French political
consciousness and which for more than two centuries has been the
focus of national debate and attention. Unlike the American
Revolution, however, the political legacy of the French Revolution
does not have an agreed meaning or univocal symbolic value and, in
fact, has been hotly contested to this day.2°7 In contrast, the Code
204. See ERNST ROBERT CURTIUS, THE CIVILIZATION OF FRANCE 35-62 (Olive
Wyon trans., Vintage Books 1962) (1930); see also 1 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE IDEN.
TrrY OF FRANCE: HISTORY AND ENVIRONMENT (Sign Reynolds trans., William Col-
lins Sons 1988) (1986); 2 BRAUDEL, supra note 93. Curtius points out that race plays
an unimportant role in French national identity. "The Frenchman has no race-con-
sciousness and no race-instinct." CURTIUS, supra at 59. See also ALAIN FINKIEL-
KRAtJT, THE DEFEAT OF THE MIND 27-33, 41-47, 102 (Judith Friedlander trans.,
Columbia University Press 1995) (1987) (discussing French attitudes toward race
and nation in the context of the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, and
stating: "In the century when nationalism reigned, France-to its credit and origi-
nality-refused to accept the idea that the spirit had ethnic roots." Id. at 102);
ERNST RENAN, QU'EST-CE OU'UNE NATION? 36-38 (Philippe Forest ed., Bordas
1991) (1882); JACOUES BARZUN, THE FRENCH RACE: THEORIES OF ITS ORIGIN AND
THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION (1932).
205. CURTIUS, supra note 204, at 63-90. See also SANCHE DE GRAMONT, THE
FRENCH: PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE 65-113 (1969).
206. See CURTIUS, supra note 204, at 3-34.
Whatever we may think about the Revolution, for France it possesses the
supreme significance of a new creation of the nation, and of the idea of a
national mission. In the coalition wars the modern national consciousness
of France arose. And this time, too, it coined a universal formula for its
national aims, and this was: Civilization.
Id. at 18. On the universality inherent in the natural law thought of the philosophes,
see Ernst Troeltsch's classic lecture, The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in
World Politics, in OTTO GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY
1500-1800, at 201 (Ernest Barker trans., Beacon Press 1957) (1934); see also ERNST
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Fritz C.A. Koelln & James
P. Pettegrove, trans., Beacon Press 1955) (1951).
207. See HANS KOHN, MAKING OF THE MODERN FRENCH MIND 14-15 (1955).
For literary attempts to come to terms with the revolutionary period and its heritage,
see VICTOR HUGO, LES MISARABLES (Gallimard 1973) (1862) and VICTOR HUGo,
QUATREVINGT-TREIZE (Gallimard 1979) (1874). It is interesting to note that much
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civil, which replaced diverse bodies of regional law with a single
code of private law for the entire nation, came to be seen as the
legal expression of the nation.
Perhaps more than any other writer, the nineteenth-century histo-
rian Jules Michelet gave expression to French ideas of nation.
Michelet's highly romantic and emotionally charged portrait of
France continues to speak with great power to the French people.2l
According to Michelet, "[tihe true point of departure of our history
must be a political division of France... [since] history is first and
foremost nothing but geography."'  From his consideration of
France region by region, Michelet ends up by presenting France as
an organic whole, one which is animated by "the general, universal
spirit of the country"; one in which the local spirit disappears more
and more each day, with "the influence of soil, climate, and race
giving way to social and political action."210 Thus, he writes:
It is a great and marvelous spectacle to cast one's regard
from the center to the extremities, and to take in with one's
eyes this vast and powerful organism, in which the diverse
parts are so skillfully brought together, opposed to each other,
associated with each other, the weak to the strong, the nega-
tive to the positive ....
of the historical writing about the French Revolution is concerned with the legal and
constitutional aspects of the period. For a discussion of French historiography dur-
ing the Restoration period which focuses on law and jurisprudence, see DONALD R.
KELLEY, HISTORIANs AND THE LAW IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY FRAN cE (1984). Pro-
fessor Kelley makes the following perceptive observation: "Although divergent in
methods and aims, jurisprudence, like history, reflects national memory and mythol-
ogy, tries to make intelligible social behavior and ideals, gives shape and substance
to cultural tradition, and assumes a didactic and sometimes official function." ldL at
26. See also STANLEY MELLON, THE POLrrICAL USES OF HSTORY: A STUDY OF
HISTORIANS IN THE FRENCi RESTORATION 1 (1958) (arguing that during the Resto-
ration period "history was the language of politics.").
It is interesting to note that the period after the American Revolution was
marked by an unusual political harmony in the new nation. Political groupings, or
parties, did not develop until somewhat later, out of the divergence of views of
Hamilton and Jefferson. Later, during the administration of President Monroe
(1817-1824), political parties declined in importance due to broad agreement on fun-
damental directions for the nation (the so-called Era of Good Feeling).
208. As Sanche de Gramont observes:
This idealized, romantic vision is necessary precisely because France, far
from being predestined to be a nation, is not a geographical unit but a quilt
of regions stitched over many centuries and after many wars, history's
choice of one of several possible arrangements of Western Europe. The
hexagon represents the longing for an orderly universe in compensation for
a turbulent national history.
DE GRAMONT, supra note 205, at 17.
209. JULEs MIcHETET, HLsTORE DE FRANCE 31 (Frangois Bluche ed., 1971).
210. Id. at 88. See also JULEs MIcHELET, THE PEOPt.E (John P. McKay trans.,
University of Illinois Press 1973) (1846).
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Viewed from north to south, France unfurls in two long or-
ganic systems, just like the human body is composed of two
systems, the gastric and the cerebrospinal: on the one hand,
the provinces of Normandy, Brittany, and Poitou, Auvergne
and Guyenne; on the other, those of Languedoc and Provence,
Burgundy and Champagne, and finally those of Picardy and
Flanders, where the two systems come together. Paris is the
brain.21'
Michelet goes on to personify his geographic, organic France as a
woman. After discussing the achievements of Joan of Arc, he
writes:
The savior of France had to be a woman. France is itself a
woman. She has the fickleness of a woman, but also her sweet
gentleness, her spontaneous and charming compassion, the
perfection of her first reaction. Even though she takes plea-
sure in vain elegance and external refinement she is at bottom
close to nature. The Frenchman, even when perverted or de-
praved, retains, more than a person of any other nationality,
his good sense and a kind heart .... 2 12
The recent two-volume work of the great contemporary French
historian Fernand Braudel, The Identity of France,213 which focuses
on the geographic and human environment of France, continues in
the tradition of Michelet of finding deep meaning in the physical
home of the French people. While denying that "France [was] in-
vented by its [g]eography, '' 214 and distancing himself from the ro-
mantic, simplifying, and personifying approach of Michelet, 15
Braudel devotes his two volumes to a detailed, meticulous, and af-
fectionate study of the different parts of France and the ties between
them. Braudel's work and its popularity in contemporary France
amply demonstrate the vitality of la belle France and l'hexagone as
key components in the idea of French nationality.
A second central aspect of French national identity is the collec-
tive national memory of people and events in its past. As Ernst Re-
nan remarked, the principle of a nation lies in "the common
possession of a rich legacy of memories., 216 Vercingetorix, Roland,
Joan of Arc, Napoleon, and General de Gaulle, for example, all fig-
211. MICHELET, supra note 209, at 88.
212. ld. at 328. See also DE GRAMONT, supra note 205, at 91 (discussing
"Michelet and the Female Nation.").
213. 1 BRAUDEL, supra note 204; 2 id. Braudel died before he could complete
the two other projected volumes of this project: Volume 3, State, Culture, and Society
and Volume 4, France outside France.
214. 1 BRAUDEL, supra note 204, at 263.
215. Id at 15, 18.
216. RENAN, supra note 204, at 41. Renan also astutely observes that a certain
amount of forgetfulness and historical error are also essential to the creation of a
nation. Id at 34.
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ure centrally in the collective memory of the French people, 17 and
the memory of their triumphs and tragedies provides an an-
chor for French national consciousness."1 Furthermore, shared
"traumas"2"' of the past, like the French Revolution and the events
of 1870 to 1871, 1914 to 1918, and 1939 to 1945, provide memories of
shared sacrifices and suffering, which, in the words of Renan, "are
worth more than triumphs, because they impose duties and mandate
common efforts."'
For Renan, in addition to common memories, "present consent,
the desire to live together, the willingness to continue to draw on the
received common heritage,"'" is an essential part of nationhood.
While it is indeed true that certain parts of present-day France
joined the French nation pursuant to popular referendum (such as
Nice and Savoy),' it is also true that certain regions (such as parts
of the Midi) - are French in spite of their own preferences at the
217. According to Sanche de Gramont: "The French hero, whether Vercingeto-
rix at Alesia, Roland at Roncevaux, Napoleon at Waterloo, or General de Gaulle
fleeing London in 1940, is often a defeated soldier;, American heroes, by contrast,
are usually victorious soldiers like Washington, Grant, and Eisenhower." DE GRA-
MoNT, supra note 205, at 70.
218. I would like to cite a personal experience as an example of the contempo-
rary vitality of certain figures from the French past. On June 2, 1996, I was present
in the Place du Vieux Marchd in Rouen on the occasion of the 565th anniversary of
the burning of Joan of Arc at the stake at that very spot in 1431. To commemorate
the occasion, the Mayor of Rouen, Yvon Robert, and a former Minister of Justice
and former President of the Conseil constitutionnel, Robert Badinter, delivered
speeches on Joan's trial and execution and on the meaning of justice. The speeches
were long and the thought complex. Nevertheless, hundreds of people, from all
walks of life, listened in rapt attention as these two learned and eloquent political
leaders made Joan live again in their imaginations and related her ancient travails to
contemporary life and politics. It is inconceivable that an audience of ordinary
Americans would have reacted similarly, or that American political leaders would
have delivered such discourses. For the remarks of Yvon Robert and Robert
Badinter, see Yvon Robert, Jeanne, un combat pour la libertg de tous, RoUmN MAO.
AZn-E, Juillet-Aoflt 1996, at 27, and Robert Badinter, Qu'une Nation en opprime tne
autre et par la force des armes lui impose sa domination, voild qui s'appelle
l'injustice, RouEN MAGAZiNE, Juillet-Aofit 1996, at 28-29. See also DE GRAmoNT,
supra note 205, at 73-77, for a discussion of the cult of Joan of Arc.
219. This word is borrowed from Sanche de Gramont. DE GRAMONr, supra,
note 205, 114-94.
220. RENAN, supra note 204, at 41.
221. Id
222. Nice and Savoy became part of France pursuant to a treaty between France
and Sardinia in 1860, which required a referendum in each of the areas to be ceded
to France as a precondition to union. Treaty relative to the Reunion of Savoy and
Nice to France, Mar. 24, 1860, Fr.-Sardinia art. 1, in 122 CLuvE PARRY, CoNsoL.
DATED TREATY SERIES 241 (Oceana Publications 1969).
223. Professor Strayer refers to the Albigensian Crusades of 1208 to 1226, by
which France annexed Languedoc, as "a North French war of conquests." JOSEPH
R. STRAYER, THE ALBirENSIAN CRUSADES iv (1971). See also WALTER L WAKE.




time they were incorporated into France. While this last observa-
tion does not speak directly to Renan's point concerning "current"
consent, it does cast doubt on the idea that consent is central to the
idea of nationhood in France.224
E. The Constitution in practice2'5
Unlike the Constitution of the United States, the French Consti-
tution of 1958 is not a source of positive law which can be applied by
any court at any time. While in theory, the French Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, its actual application is narrowly lim-
ited." 6 Since in France the functions performed by the United
States Supreme Court are divided among three independent tribu-
nals, the Conseil d' tat, the Conseil constitutionnel, and the Cour de
224. Renan's famous lecture "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?" was delivered at the
Sorbonne in 1882. Its unstated premise was that the provinces of Alsace and Lor-
raine, taken forcibly from France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, were part
of the French nation regardless of the race, language, religion, commercial relations,
or geography of those provinces. RENAN, supra note 204, at 36-41. For the first
decade after becoming part of Germany, Alsace-Lorraine expressed its desire to
rejoin France in an annual resolution. Later, however, as secularism gained ground
in France, the people of devoutly-Catholic Alsace-Lorraine became less sure of their
desires. Alsace-Lorraine was reincorporated into France after the First World War,
but soon after special educational and religious regimes applicable only to Alsace-
Lorraine were adopted. See COLLIARD, supra note 187, at 440-41, 531-33.
225. See generally CAPPELLElrI, supra note 117, at 153-54:
In the last few decades.., much of the rest of continental Europe has been
forcefully and openly moving away from the anti-judicial review approach.
As for France-the historical leader in the reaction against abusive judicial
activism-it should not be surprising that the movement away has been,
instead, very cautious and gradual.
The classic work expressing the French hostility to judicial review is EDOUARD LAM-
BERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LuTTE CoNTRE LA La8OISLATION
SOCIALE AUX IETATS-UNIS (1921). See also Michael H. Davis, A Government of
Judges: An Historical Re-View, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (1987).
226. Commenting on the situation in 1957, under the Constitution of the Fourth
Republic, two French constitutionalists have this to say:
[T]he constitution has legal authority incontestably superior to that of law;
hence, law cannot derogate from the constitution. There is no question of
disputing the principle itself of such superiority, but, from a legal point of
view, the French solution is peculiar since there is no means to ensure con-
trol of constitutionality. A principle without sanction cannot be considered
a legal principle.
The whole constitutional organization in France thus rests upon the
power of Parliament. If Parliament should happen to vote a law which
conflicts with the constitution, it would be necessary to regard this act less
as a violation of the constitution than as an indirect amendment.
M. Letourneur & R. Drago, The Rule of Law as Understood in France, 7 Am. J.
ComP. L. 147, 150-51 (1958). But see Denis Talon, The Constitution and the Courts
in France, 27 Am. J. ComP. L. 567, 575 (1979) (arguing that "beyond our changing
constitutions, the general principles of the law remain and courts have various
means to enforce them .... ").
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Cassation, it is necessary to examine separately how each of these
tribunals relates to the Constitution in order to understand the prac-
tical application of the French Constitution in the courts.
1. The Conseil constitutionnel
According to Article 61 of the 1958 Constitution:
Organic laws, before their promulgation, and regulations of
the Parliamentary assemblies, before they are put into effect,
must be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which shall
decide on their conformity to the Constitution.
For the same purpose, laws may be referred to the Constitu-
tional Council before their promulgation by the President of
the Republic, the Premier, the President of the National As-
sembly, the President of the Senate, or sixty deputies or sixty
senators. 27
Article 62 provides that "[a] provision declared unconstitutional
may not be promulgated or put into effect."' 2
In essence, the Conseil constitutionnel is a non-judicial organ that
plays a part in the legislative process. 29 It has been called a "third
legislative chamber." 0 With respect to ordinary laws, it intervenes,
if invoked, after a law is passed, but before it is promulgated and
thereby enters into force, to determine whether or not the law con-
forms to the requirements of the Constitution. If the particular law
under review does not conform to the Constitution, that law may
still be modified by Parliament to bring it into conformity with the
Constitution and thus enter into force.
As originally conceived by the drafters of the 1958 Constitution,
the principle purpose of constitutional review was to assure that
227. La Constitution [CONsT.] art. 61 (Fr.), in BERMAm ET AL, supra note 172.
ch. 2 at 25.
228. La Constitution [CoNsr.] art. 62 (Fr.), in BERMANN ET At, supra note 172,
ch. 2 at 25.
229. See James E. Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constintional Lib-
erties in France, 20 AM. J. Co hp. L. 431 (1972).
The invalidation of an act of Parliament on the ground that it infringes
constitutionally protected rights of the citizen is alien to French constitu-
tional tradition. The doctrine of separation of powers, the notion that Par-
liamentary legislation constitutes the authentic expression of the general
will, and an aversion to "government by judges" which dates back to the
ancien regime have formed an insurmountable barrier to the introduction
of judicial review in France. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic which
came into force on October 4, 1958, changed none of this but did provide
for a non-judicial Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionne) with
power to determine whether legislation adopted by Parliament and submit-
ted to the Council for review under rigorous procedural limitations is in
"conformity with the Constitution."
Id. at 431 (footnotes omitted).
230. STONE, supra note 10, at 198.
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Parliament did not encroach on the law making domain accorded to
the executive branch of government by the Constitution."' One of
the principal innovations of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic
was to accord considerable law making power to the executive
branch. Parliament's legislative authority extended only to those
matters specifically enumerated in Article 34 of the Constitution-
"[m]atters other than those which are within the domain of law have
an executive character (caractere r~glementaire)." 3
In a landmark decision in 1971, Libert6 d'Association,234 which
has been called France's Marbury v. Madison,15 the Conseil consti-
tutionnel refused to allow the promulgation of a law enacted by Par-
liament on the ground that it was substantively unconstitutional.
Even though the law in question was within the enumerated parlia-
mentary domain and thus raised no separation of powers problems,
in the Conseil's view it violated a substantive prohibition of constitu-
tional status. The prohibition in question (the protection of the lib-
erty of association) does not explicitly appear in the Constitution,
but rather was derived by the Conseil from the Constitution's Pre-
amble which provides: "The French people hereby solemnly pro-
claim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of
national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, reaf-
firmed and complemented by the Preamble of the Constitution of
1946.''1 36 The reference to the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946
allowed the Conseil to treat the following language from that Pre-
amble as part of the Constitution of 1958: "[The French people]
solemnly reaffirm ... the fundamental principles recognized by the
231. La Constitution [CONST.] art. 41 (Fr.), in BERMANN ET AL., supra note 172,
ch. 2 at 19-20. See James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. CT.
REv. 189, 212-23, 245-51. The Constitutional Council was also given the task of
assuring that the electoral process, including referenda, complies with the Constitu-
tion and applicable law (articles 58, 59, and 60) and with reviewing all organic laws
before their promulgation (article 61). La Constitution [CONST.] (Fr.), in BERMANN
ET AL., supra note 172, ch. 2 at 1.
232. Even within the domain of the law, Parliament has rule-making power ("La
loi fixe les rdgles concernant") only in specified areas; in other areas Parliament's
power is limited to determining "fundamental principles" ("La loi ddtermine les
principes fiindamentaux") (e.g., in the areas of national defense, self-government of
local governmental units, education, employment, labor unions, and social security)
or enacting "planning laws" (lois de programme) (with respect to the ecomonic and
social activities of the State) ("Des lois de programme diterminent les objectifs de
Iaction dconomique et sociale de l' tat.").
233. La Constitution [CONsr.] art. 37 (Fr.), in BERMANN ET At, supra note 172,
ch. 2 at 19.
234. For the complete text of the decision of the Constitutional Counsel and an
excellent discussion and evaluation, see FAVOREu & PHILIP, supra note 203, at 242-
59.
235. George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Was It France's Marbury v. Madison?, 35 OHiO
ST. L.J. 910 (1974).
236. La Constitution [CoNsT.] preamble (Fr.), in BERMANN ET AL., supra note
172, ch. 2 at 9.
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laws of the Republic,"2 7 and then to determine that liberty of asso-
ciation was one such fundamental principle. Prior to the Constitu-
tional Council's decision of 1971, it was never thought that simply
because the Preamble of the Constitution of 1958 referred to the
Declaration of 1789 and the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946
that those documents had legal force s By one bold stroke, then,
the Conseil constitutionnel not only created a vast body of substan-
tive constitutional law (the express provisions contained in the 1789
Declaration and the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946), but also
laid the foundation for an open-ended ability to define "the funda-
mental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic."' 9 Taken
together, these sources of law that have "constitutional status"
(valeur constitutionnelle)-the Constitution of 1958, the Declaration
of 1789, the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946, and "the funda-
mental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic"-have
become known as "le bloc de constitutionnalitV."2 °
While the Libertd d'Association decision established the right of
the Conseil constitutionnel to review parliamentary enactments pur-
suant to a broad and somewhat indeterminate set of constitutional
standards and principles, it did not extend the Conseil's scope of
review. The window of opportunity for Conseil review remained ex-
tremely limited. In 1974, however, Article 61 of the Constitution
was amended to allow 60 senators or 60 deputies to refer legislation
to the Conseil for review.241 Article 61, as presently written, thus
assures that virtually all legislation can be brought before the Con-
seil, as it is extremely unlikely that the opposition will fail to win 60
seats in one of the two chambers 42 Nevertheless, once a law (loi)
is in fact promulgated, it is no longer susceptible to constitutional
challenge, even though serious constitutional questions may arise in
its application or relevant social values have undergone significant
change.
2. The Conseil d'ttat
Constitutional principles may also be applied by the Conseil
d'Etat, the apex of the French system of administrative tribunals3z4
3
237. La Constitution of 1946 [CONST. 1946] preamble (Fr.). in BEiAm* ET AL.,
supra note 172, ch. 2 at 6.
238. Morton, supra note 10, at 90.
239. La Constitution of 1946 [CONST. 1946] preamble (Fr.), in B_.RiANN Er A..,
supra note 172, ch. 2 at 6.
240. See GHtsrnN ET AL., supra note 9, at 229-32.
241. La Constitution [CONsr.] art. 61 (Fr.), in BERMANN ET AL., supra note 172,
ch. 2 at 25.
242. The landslide victory of la Droite in the parliamentary elections of 1993,
however, did come close to achieving this result.
243. The Conseil d'tat was established by Napoleon in 1799. During the course
of the nineteenth century, a section of the Conseil, which eventually came to be
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In a 1959 decision, Syndicat Gndnral des Ing~nieurs-Conseils,42" the
Conseil d'gtat decided that executive legislation (rdglements pursu-
ant to article 37 of the Constitution) is subject to judicial review.245
While lois must still be applied by administrative tribunals, the vast
domain of rdglements enacted by the government pursuant to article
37 of the Constitution is now subject to judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, in interpreting and judging the legality of executive
legislation and specific administrative actions, the Conseil d'gtat ap-
plies les principes g~ndraux du droit (general principles of law).
"[T]he[se] principles are deduced as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, based on the assumption that the legislator is anxious to pre-
serve the essential liberties of the individual.""4 6 Among the
sources from which the Conseil d'gtat derives these general princi-
ples of law are "constitutional documents such as the 1789 Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
of the Fourth Republic. Examples include: liberty, respect of the
rights of citizens, equality in all its aspects. ,24. It is important to
recognize, however, that these principles do not owe their binding
force to any particular text, such as the Constitution; but are rather
the application by the Conseil d'gtat of principles that it deems in-
herent in the liberal tradition of 1789, in the principle of equity, and
called the Section du Contentieux, emerged as a court of general jurisdiction which
"manifest[ed] all the features which the French associate with a court-a public
hearing .... the representation of the parties by counsel, a spokesman for the public
interest, a collegiate bench, and a published judgment supported by reasons." L.
NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 46 (4th ed. 1993).
The need for such a body, to assure the legality of administrative action, arose from
the withdrawal from the ordinary civil courts of any jurisdiction in administrative
matters by the Law of 16-24 August 1790. Article 13 of that Law, which is still in
force today, reads:
Judicial functions are distinct and will always remain separate from ad-
ministrative functions. It shall be a criminal offence for the judges of the
ordinary courts to interfere in any manner whatsoever with the operation
of the administration, nor shall they call administrators to account before
them in respect of the exercise of their official functions.
Id. at 43 (quoting and translating Article 13 of the Law of 16-24 August 1790). For a
history of the development of administrative law in France (to 1908) and a compari-
son of the fundamental ideas underlying the French system of administrative law
with Anglo-American jurisprudence, see the famous essay of Professor Dicey, "Rule
of Law Compared with Droit Administratif," which appears as Chapter XII in Di.
cEY, supra note 175, at 324-401. See also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAw WORLD 306-38 (1954).
244. Conseil d'ttat, [D. Jur.] 541 (Fr.). The decision, along with a commentary, is
reprinted in LONG ET AL., supra note 202, at 560.
245. See supra notes 225-33 and accompanying text.
246. BROWN & BELL, supra note 243, at 206; see also JEAN RIVERO & JEAN
WALINE, DRorr ADMINiSTRATin 67-69 (15th ed. 1994).
247. BROWN & BELL, supra note 243, at 207. Brown and Bell remark that
"[s]uch fundamental rights, which are mostly entrenched in the text of the United
States Constitution, in French law are protected to a large extent by resort to the
unwritten principes g~n~raux." Id. at 209.
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in the necessities of la vie sociale.2  Over time, these principles
have been associated with the body of decisional law (1a jurispru-
dence) of the Conseil d'gtat, rather than with the Constitution or
other texts with valeur constitutionnelle.
3. The Cour de Cassation
The Cour de Cassation, which stands at the apex of the civil court
system, also has taken a step toward the application of constitutional
standards, although, again, in a somewhat oblique manner. Tradi-
tionally, the Cour de Cassation had no power whatsoever to refuse
to apply a loi enacted by Parliament. Furthermore, the powers of
the Cour de Cassation, were limited to assure that a strong judiciary
did not emerge.349
In Administration des Douanes v. Socidtd Cafrs Jacques Vabre," °
the Cour de Cassation decided that it could apply constitutionally-
derived standards to evaluate the applicability of a loi when faced
with a conflicting international commitment. In that case the Cour
de Cassation had to decide whether a regularly promulgated French
loi that conflicted with a prior European Community norm should
be refused application by French judges. The Cour refused to apply
the French loi not on the ground that it conflicted with a norm that,
in its view, was explicitly accorded higher status by the Constitution,
but rather that a proper reading, or interpretation, of the subse-
quent loi indicated that the legislature intended to give precedence
to the Community norm. Mauro Cappelletti describes the implica-
248. RwERO & WAL.N, supra note 246, at 68. According to Yves Gaudemet:
[The general principles developed and applied by the administrative judge]
are at the frontier of the law .... They are the windows that allow the light
of day, but a subdued light, to enter the jurist's office. Thus, legal princi-
ples are not at the outset rules of law. As Fr. Gdny wrote: "the general
principles of law represent an ideal of reason and justice, in keeping with
the permanent essence of human nature."
YvEs GAUDEiEr, LEs METHODES DU JUGE ADimNmsRATIF 35 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
249. For example, the Cour de Cassation for many years lacked the power to
render binding decisions even with respect to the particular matter that was before
the court. Its power was limited to quashing the lower court judgment and sending
the matter to another lower court for reconsideration de novo. The lower court was
not bound by the decision of the Cour de Cassation. In 1979. this situation was
changed by law. Now a decision of the Cour de Cassation is binding on the second
lower court to which the case is referred after the Cour de Cassatlon has rendered a
decision in a plenary session. Also, according to the famous Article 5 of the Code
civil: "Judges are forbidden to decide by way of a general and rule-making decision
the cases submitted to them." RUDOLF SCHLESINGER ET AL-, COMPARATIvE LAW
465 (5th ed. 1988).
250. Cass. ch. mixte, May 24, 1975, D. 1975, 497, concl. Touffait. This case is
reprinted, with commentary, in HENRI CAPiTANT, Las GRANDS ARirs DE LA JURIS-
PRUDENCE crVILE 15 (10th ed. 1994); see also CAPPEU=.T , supra note 117, at 157-
61 (1989) (discussing the aforementioned case).
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tions of the Cafrs Jacques Vabre decision as "extremely far-reach-
ing."'251 The decision in Cafds Jacques Vabre in effect resulted in the
application of a Community norm because article 55 of the Consti-
tution accords priority to treaties over laws. Thus it appears as if the
court is refusing to apply a law on the basis of a provision of the
Constitution. The Cour de Cassation nevertheless felt constrained
to articulate its decision in terms less at variance with the long
French tradition of the sanctity of the law.
F. The French judiciary
As discussed in the first part of this Essay, in the United States
the federal judiciary is the principal guardian of the Constitution.
Moreover, the men and women who occupy positions on the federal
bench, at all levels, are extremely well equipped to apply the princi-
ples of that document in the actual cases that come before them and
to fashion remedies to effectuate their decisions. In France the situ-
ation is markedly different. As we have seen, in France, since the
Revolution, the judicial function has been regarded as subservient
to the legislative power. In fact, one of the principal goals of the
French Revolution was to remove power from judges, or, as Profes-
sor Merryman has remarked, "to make the law judge-proof." 2
The post-revolutionary attitude toward the judicial function has
had a significant impact on the nature of the French judiciary." 3
Professor Merryman provides a telling description:
251. CAPPELLE-rI, supra note 117, at 159. According to Professor Cappelletti:
[A] consistent interpretation of the Cafds Jacques Vabre decision leads to a
conclusion which is no less important for being paradoxical. Based on the
traditional prohibition of judicial review of the constitutionality of (parlia-
mentary) legislation, French lois, once promulgated, are not subject to
court control; they are unchallengeable and supreme, no matter whether
they violate the French constitutional texts, and, in particular, the sacred
French texts and traditions on les droits de l'homme. Since Cafes Jacques
Vabre, however, this basic prohibition can no longer bind the judges of
France wherever French legislation is in conflict not with the French texts
and traditions, but with a transnational bill of rights, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
Ia at 160. See also Jorg Polakiewicz & Valdrie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human
Rights Convention in Domestic Law: The Impact of Strasbourg Case-Law in States
where Direct Effect is Given to the Convention, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 65, 75-78
(1991); Barbie, Cass. ass. pl6n., Jan. 26, 1984, D. 1990.113.
252. John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 109, 109
(1996) [hereinafter The French Deviation]. See also supra notes 225-33; DAWSON,
supra note 4, at 263-431; Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judi-
cial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995) (contrasting
the official "portrait" of the French judge with what the judge does in practice);
Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 92-
108 (1994); John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It The French and German
Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1865 (1988).
253. For a discussion of the organization of courts and the status of judges in the
aftermath of the Revolution, see ISSER WOLOcH, THE NEw REGIME 297-320 (1994).
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The most powerful consequence of the French doctrine of
separation of powers may have been to demean judges and the
judicial function. The attempt to depict the judicial function
as something narrow, mechanical and uncreative and to por-
tray judges as clerks ... has had a self-fulfilling effect. Judges
are at the bottom of the scale of prestige among the legal pro-
fessions in France... and the best people... accordingly seek
other legal careers. 25 4
This description of the French judiciary of course does not apply
to members of the Section du Contentieux of the Conseil d'gtat or to
the members of the Conseil constitutionnel. In fact, it is these two
institutions that have, within their limited spheres of competence,
breathed life into the principles of the Constitution and the constitu-
tional text itself.255
The Conseil constitutionnel is composed of nine members ap-
pointed for (unrenewable) nine-year terms, plus living ex-presidents
of the Republic. Three members are appointed by the President of
the Republic, three by the President of the Senate, and three by the
President of the National Assembly." 6 According to Alec Stone,
"the single most important criterion for appointment... is political
affiliation, and the Council has been dominated by professional poli-
According to WVoloch, the guiding principles for the post-revolutionary organization
of the judicial branch were the following-
The law quickly became the Revolution's transcendent deity. Judges,
however, would no longer be its high priests .... Law would be made and.
if need be, interpreted by the representatives of the people, the legislature.
Judges ... would simply uphold and apply the law as salaried employees of
the state rather than as a caste or corporation within society.
Id. at 301.
254. The French Deviation, supra note 252, at 116. Professor Merryman also
says:
Popular distrust of judges, the doctrine of the separation of powers and
the post-Revolutionary measures taken to limit the judicial role in the legal
process had a demeaning effect on the French judiciary. While the judges
of the parlements in pre-Revolutionary France stood high in the legal and
social order, the position of the judge in the Republic was that of a civil
servant who did relatively undemanding work, merely following legislative
and executive orders. The hierarchy of legal occupations ran from legisla-
tor at the top, through scholar and advocate in declining order of prestige,
to judge at the bottom. Judicial recruiting practices, salaries, working con-
ditions and career patterns reflected this point of view.... Judges, even on
the highest courts, were faceless, anonymous career bureaucrats. This view
of the legal function, and of judges, became self-fulfilling. The best legal
minds chose other careers.
Id. at 113-14.
255. See supra notes 227-48 and accompanying text. See also John Bell, Princi-
pies and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAT.. L REv. 1757 (1988)
(discussing selection of ordinary judges, administrative law judges, and members of
the Conseil constitutionnel).
256. La Constitution [CoNsr.] art. 56 (Fr.), in BERMANN FT ALt, supra note 172,
ch. 2 at 24.
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ticians." 2 7 This tendency, as well as the unfamiliarity of Conseil
members with public law, has been the subject of much criticism in
France. 5 18 Nevertheless, the Conseil constitutionnel has emerged as
a major force in French legislative politics and has, by and large,
succeeded in defining its role in judicial, rather than political,
terms." 9 In sum, the Conseil constitutionnel is not a part of a bu-
reaucracy, nor is it staffed by bureaucrats. It is for the most part
composed of high-status, senior officials who have achieved some
degree of success in the political process. Moreover, once on the
Conseil, they can act independently of political pressures to the de-
gree that they wish.26 °
The Section du Contentieux of the Conseil d'gtat, the supreme tri-
bunal for the system of administrative courts, is composed of about
one hundred members, divided into ten subsections.261 Most mem-
bers of the Council, including those of the Section du Contentieux,
are recruited from l' cole Nationale d'Administration (the National
School of Administration, known in France as l' NA). The school
attracts the best students and entry is highly competitive. Upon
completion of the program, graduates choose among available posi-
tions in the administration, their choices depending on their class
rank. The Conseil d'Rtat, along with the Cour des Comptes and the
Inspection des Finances, typically attracts those graduates with the
highest class standing.262 About one fourth of the members of the
Conseil are recruited from among the most distinguished members
of the active administration (the corps prfectoral). According to
Brown and Bell:
This mixed system of entry provides the Conseil with a re-
markable combination of young intellect and mature experi-
ence. It ensures that the Conseil has within its ranks both
theorectical [sic] and practical expertise in public administra-
tion. And it has proved a highly successful recipe. 263
257. STo E', supra note 10, at 50.
258. Id. at 52, 234.
259. Id. at 8-10.
260. See id. at 78-91 for a discussion of the role of the Council in a series of
politically important decisions.
261. For a description of the composition, functioning, and role of the Section du
Contentieux of the Conseil d' tat, see BROWN & BELL, supra note 243, at 71-73.
Although the Section du Contentieux, like the entire Conseil d' tat, is composed of
career civil servants, Brown and Bell state: "Step by step, from the origins of the
Conseil d'etat ... the Section du Contentieux ha[s] progressively detached itself
both from the administrative sections of the Conseil and from the 'active administra-
tion' outside the Conseil." l at 76.
262. Id. at 79.
263. Id. at 79-80. Brown and Bell also point out that recruitment to regional
administrative tribunals follows a similar pattern. Id. at 80.
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G. The French bar
The legal profession in France' also differs in significant ways
from its American counterpart, which makes French lawyers less
likely than Americans to rely on the Constitution in the course of
their work or to seek to construct novel substantive theories or de-
vise new remedies to advance their clients' causes. In fact, during
the last few decades the profession has been undergoing significant
changes in both function 2  and structure,266 with a decided orienta-
tion away from public service and toward the world of business, 7
which makes creative and aggressive advocacy for social, economic,
or political ends even less likely.2 Professor Karpik, the leading
contemporary analyst of the French bar, makes the following inter-
esting comparative observation regarding the American bar, which
he regards as also oriented today toward business practice:
[I n the United States, paradoxically,... the [legal] profession,
although dominated by the business bar, also exhibits... a
public orientation which manifests itself in the importance at-
tributed to moral authority, to the civil dimension, to partici-
pation in governmental activity, and to the rallying of public
opinion.3 6 9
H. Legal education in France
The system of legal education in France is quite different from
that in the United States.270 The calibre of students attracted to
legal education and the type of training they receive bear impor-
264. The term "lawyer" as it is understood in the United States has no real
equivalent in France. For a description of the legal professions in France, see WAL-
TER CmzIs & ROBERT McKEON, IrrRoucrioN TO FRENCH LAw 45-50 (1995);
CHRISTIAN DADomo & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FPnNcti LEGAL SYsEMi 110-50
(1993).
265. See generally LucIEN KARPr, LES AVOCATs: ENTRE L'PTAT, LE PuBLuc ET
LE MARCMr-, XIP-XXe sICLE (1995).
266. Id. at 374-426; see also Anne Boigeol, The French Bar The Difficulties of
Unifying a Divided Profession, in 2 LAWvYERs IN SOCITY. THE CIvItL LAW WORLD
258 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds. 1988); Yves-Louis Sage, The 1990
French Laws on the Legal Professions, 41 Am. J. CoMP. L 649 (1993).
267. "In France, the history of the [legal] profession can be organized around
three models: the bar of the State, the classic bar, and the business bar, or, if one
prefers, the principle of the State, the principle of the public, and the principle of the
market. Each model represents a particular comprehensive regulatory structure as
well as a different type of lawyer." KARPiK, supra note 265, at 456-57.
268. This has not always been the case in France. During the Third Republic
(1870-1940), for example, lawyers played a major role in French political life and
progressive advocacy. See KAm, , supra note 265, at 170-227; YvEs-HENRJ
GAUDEMET, LES JuRisTs ET" LA VIE POLrrnOUE DE LA RAPUBLIOUE (1970).
269. KARPIK, supra note 265, at 458.
270. See Claudine Bloch, The Teaching of Law in France, 15 DALHOUSIE L J. 476
(1989); see also C. Mouly & C. Atias, Faculty Recruitment in France, 41 Am. J. ComP.
L. 401 (1993). For a general description of the French system of higher education,
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tantly on the proclivities and abilities of law-trained professionals
aggressively and creatively to defend the social, economic, and polit-
ical values embodied in the nation's fundamental legal texts.
Whereas the American system can be described as attracting ex-
tremely capable students and training them to be effective, in-
dependent-minded advocates, the French law faculties do not, as a
rule, attract the most capable students,2 71 and methods of instruc-
tion tend not to foster independence, individual initiative, or practi-
cal skills.272 Perhaps this is because, as Michel Crozier explains, the
primary function of education in France is not the preparation of
students for coping with the practical problems they will encounter
later, but rather it is "selection," that is, the assignment of a place
and function to each person in society.27 3 Consequently, as Crozier
observes, "the processes of experimental learning are devalued, and
the effort to make contact with the outside world is proscribed,
while abstract programs and deductive methods are justified. 2 74
The typical classroom experience for the French law student, es-
pecially in the formative early years, is the cours magistral, or large
lecture class.275 Students are not expected to be prepared or to par-
ticipate in discussion, and, in most cases, are not afforded the oppor-
tunity to pose questions. The professor lectures and the students
take notes. Lectures are well-organized, systematic presentations of
the course materials; professors often assist the students in taking
accurate notes by telling students where new parts or subparts of
their presentations begin. In fact, cours magistraux are in most cases
dictations (dictges) by the professor, with the students seeking to
see JAMES CORBETr, THROUGH FRENCH WiNDows: AN INTRODUCTION TO FRANCE
IN TrH NiNm-IEs 112-32 (1994).
271. It is interesting to note that there are no grandes dcoles for the teaching of
law. "In terms of prestige the grandes 6coles dominate the French educational sys-
tem. ... The grandes 6coles lead to careers in the grands corps: the Conseil d'gtat,
the Inspectorat des Finances, diplomacy, prefectorial administration, .... et cetera."
MICHEL CROZIER, THE STALLED SOCIETY 116 (1970).
272. "The narrowest kind of rationalism still dominates all these fields [classical
humanities, legal studies, physics and mathematics, history] . . ." Id. at 114.
273. Michel Crozier describes French society as an "ascriptive society... [t]hat,
is a society in which each person is assigned a place and function, not according to
what he has achieved or seems capable of achieving but in terms of his status and
rank of origin." IL at 110.
274. Id. James Corbett points out that lycie (secondary school) students seeking
entry into the grandes coles typically specialize in mathematics and physics in prep-
aration for taking the baccalaur~at "C' (rather than the bac A-languages, litera-
ture, and the social sciences; bac B-economics; bac D-biology; bac E-
engineering; bac F, G, H-various technical subjects, including business). CORBETr,
supra note 270, at 115-16.
275. Whereas American students must have an undergraduate degree before en-
tering law school, French students enter a facult de droit immediately upon comple-
tion of secondary school. During the first two years of law study (which culminates
with successful students receiving the D.E. U.G.) classes are extremely large and the
total university experience impersonal.
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transcribe the professor's presentation as accurately as possible.
This experience breeds passivity and acceptance on the part of the
student. Moreover, dynamics both in the classroom and outside
produce and reinforce distance between professor and student, in
effect teaching lessons of respect for authority and hierarchy. While
it is true that French law students also attend travaux dirig&s, small
sections supposedly for the discussion of assigned materials under
the direction of an instructor, what actually occurs in these settings
tends to replicate the cour magistral: TD instructors present lengthy
explanations of the material under consideration, or require stu-
dents to prepare written responses to questions, which are then re-
cited by the student to the class.
IV. CONCLUSION
The twin traumas of revolution and post-revolutionary turmoil
gave birth to new political societies in both the United States and
France. New political understandings were embodied in institu-
tional arrangements and in legal conceptions associated with certain
foundational texts-the Constitution in the United States and the
Code civil in France. As a result, constitutionalism took deep roots
in the United States, but did not do so in France. It is only recently,
as the political heritage and conceptual categories of the Revolution
fade in importance, that ideas usually associated with constitutional
government, like judicial review of legislation and the limitation of
executive power by courts pursuant to substantive constitutional
standards, have begun to make much actual headway in France.
The long resistance of French society to constitutional government
attests to the perspicacity of Montesquieu and Rousseau who both
regarded institutional and legal understandings established at the
birth of political societies as formative and difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to alter subsequently.276
276. "At the birth of [political] societies, says Montesquieu, it is the leaders of
republics who bring about the institution, and thereafter it is the institution that
forms the leaders of the republic." RoussEtu, supra note 121, at 39.
Peoples, like men, are only docile in their youth. As they grow older they
become incorrigible. Once customs are established and prejudices have be-
come deeply rooted, it is a dangerous and vain undertaking to want to re-
form them.
... [There occur however] violent epochs when revolutions do to peoples
what certain crises do to individuals, when the horror of the past takes the
place of forgetfulness, and when the state, set afire by civil wars, is reborn,
as it were, from its ashes and takes on again the vigor of youth ....
Id. at 41-42 (footnote omitted).
What people, therefore, is suited for legislation? One that, finding itself
bound by some union of origin, interest or convention, has not yet felt the
true yoke of laws. One that has no custom or superstitions that are deeply
rooted.... [Finally, one that brings together the stability of an ancient
people and the docility of a new people.
Id at 45-46.
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